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I. INTRODUCTION
No one living in a coastal county in Texas should need to be told
that hurricanes are dangerous.1 From the 1900 Galveston hurricane,2
* Isidor Loeb Professor, University of Missouri School of Law. This Article is
based on comments I made at a symposium, titled “Natural Disasters, Stakeholder
Engagement and Dispute Resolution,” held at the Texas A&M University School of
Law, Fort Worth, Texas, on April 13, 2018.  I express my deep appreciation to the
following for their generous support during my work on this project:  the Lawrence G.
Crahan & Linda S. Legg Faculty Research Fellowship; the Edgar Mayfield Faculty
Research Fellowship; and the Charles H. Rehm Faculty Research Fellowship. I also
thank Matthew Neuman, Missouri Law ’19, for his superb research assistance, and the
Shook, Hardy & Bacon law firm, which provided funding for Matthew’s work through
the Shook, Hardy & Bacon Research Assistant Program.
1. An alarming number of people disregard hurricane warnings and evacuation
orders at great personal peril. See, e.g., LINDA I. GIBBS & CASWELL F. HOLLOWAY,
HURRICANE SANDY AFTER ACTION: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO MAYOR
MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG 8–10 (2013), available at http://www.nyscal.org/files/2013/
06/Hurricane-Sandy-After-Action-May-20131.pdf (explaining that “thousands of peo-
ple did not leave the evacuation zone” after Mayor Bloomberg issued a mandatory
391
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which produced the largest number of fatalities of any natural disaster
event in U.S. history,3 to Hurricane Harvey in 2017,4 which may rank
as the second-most costly catastrophe in our nation’s history,5 Texans
have endured some of the costliest natural disasters to ever inflict
havoc in the U.S.
If the second-most populous state in the nation were the only state
to endure such calamities, there would be great reason for concern.6
Texas, however, is not alone. The hurricane risk presents itself along
the entire U.S. coastline from Cutler, Maine to Brownsville, Texas.7
evacuation during Hurricane Sandy, and forty-three New Yorkers died). Warnings go
unheeded for a variety of reasons, including personal perception of risk, evacuation
logistics, past storm experience, confusion surrounding official warnings, and an un-
willingness to separate from pets. Gregg C. Bowser & Susan L. Cutter, Stay or Go:
Examining Decision Making and Behavior in Hurricane Evacuations, 57 ENV’T 28,
30–38 (2015). Thus, repeated reminders to the public of the dangers of hurricanes are
important.
2. See generally ERIK LARSON, ISAAC’S STORM: A MAN, A TIME, AND THE
DEADLIEST HURRICANE IN HISTORY (1999) (recounting the damage of an unantici-
pated hurricane).
3. The death toll from the Galveston hurricane is unknown, but estimates put the
number at approximately 12,000. Christopher Ingraham, Hurricane Maria Was One of
the Deadliest Natural Disasters in U.S. History, According to a New Estimate, WASH.
POST (June 2, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/06/02/hur
ricane-maria-was-one-of-the-deadliest-natural-disasters-in-u-s-history-according-to-a-
new-estimate [https://perma.cc/2LUL-CT3G] (Galveston hurricane death toll of
12,000 exceeds recent estimate of Hurricane Maria’s death toll of 4,645). Estimates of
the death toll in Hurricane Maria have risen since the storm. After initially putting the
number of deaths at sixty-four, in August 2018 the government of Puerto Rico en-
dorsed a recent analysis of the death toll estimating that 2,975 people died as a result
of the disaster and its effects. See Sheri Fink, Nearly a Year After Hurricane Maria,
Puerto Rico Revises Death Toll to 2,975, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/2018/08/28/us/puerto-rico-hurricane-maria-deaths.html [https://perma.cc/
8SMK-CWBC].
4. Hurricane Harvey struck the Texas coast as a Category 4 hurricane, but its
extreme impact came when “[t]he storm then stalled, with its center over or near the
Texas coast for four days, dropping historic amounts of rainfall of more than 60 inches
over southeastern Texas.” ERIC S. BLAKE & DAVID A. ZELINSKY, HURRICANE HAR-
VEY, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR. 1 (2018), available at https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/
tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf. The storm was also deadly with at least sixty-eight direct
deaths and thirty-five indirect deaths. Id. at 8.
5. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: Table of Events, NAT’L CTRS.
FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/events/US/1980-2018 (last vis-
ited Aug. 31, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6BCU-FHTC]. As of August 2018, Hurricane
Harvey’s CPI-adjusted cost was $127.5 billion, behind only Hurricane Katrina at
$165.0 billion. Id. But see Facts + Statistics: Hurricanes, INS. INFO. INST., https://
www.iii.org/fact-statistic/facts-statistics-hurricanes (last visited Dec. 12, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/7XDV-L7MD] (indicating that when loss estimates become final, Harvey’s
total costs will range between $50 and $72 billion, making Harvey the sixth-costliest
hurricane on record).
6. The three most populous states are California, Texas, and Florida. U.S. and
World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/popclock/
(last visited June 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/29Q6-M9ZB]. Each state is subject to
significant natural disaster risk.
7. See Ian Livingston, The Regions Most At-Risk for Atlantic Hurricanes in 3
Maps, WASH. POST (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/capital-
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This risk is not best measured by miles; this run of coast is the land
area in the U.S. that has the largest population8 and property densi-
ties.9 Florida has the most exposure because 79% of Florida’s total
insured property is on the coasts,10 but New York and Texas have high
exposures, too.11 Compounding the concern is that the risk of hurri-
cane damage is increasing and shows no signs of abating. A growing
consensus exists among scientists that warmer oceans increase the
amount of water vapor entering the atmosphere, which, although it
may not increase the number of hurricanes, increases the intensity of
those that form.12 In addition, melting glaciers and polar ice caps are
weather-gang/wp/2015/09/14/the-regions-most-at-risk-for-atlantic-hurricanes-in-3-
maps/?utm_term=.d09f5e47a012 [https://perma.cc/H8US-B73P]. Hurricanes typically
weaken into tropical storms by the time they reach the colder waters of New England,
but storms of this intensity can cause immense damage. EDWARD AGUADO & JAMES
E. BURT, UNDERSTANDING WEATHER AND CLIMATE 364–65 (4th ed. 2007). The
Great Hurricane of 1938 stands as the most devastating recorded hurricane; it caused
extensive damage in Long Island and Connecticut. See Aimee Tucker, Worst Hurri-
canes in New England History, NEW ENGLAND TODAY (Feb. 26, 2018), https://newen-
gland.com/today/living/new-england-history/worst-hurricanes-in-new-england-history/
[https://perma.cc/2BFD-4SJ9]. If the 1938 hurricane were to repeat itself today, it
would be a catastrophe of enormous proportions, probably the worst in economic
terms in the history of our planet. See John Rather, Dreading A Replay of the 1938
Hurricane, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 28, 2005), https://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/28/nyregion/
nyregionspecial2/dreading-a-replay-of-the-1938-hurricane.html [https://perma.cc/
Y4ZE-5KP3]. See Hurricane Preparedness, Rio Grande Valley: Hurricane History,
NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/bro/hurrprep_history (last visited
June 22, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CA53-ZRGY] (detailing nine notable storms, includ-
ing Hurricane Dolly (2008), Hurricane Ike (2008), and Hurricane Alex (2010)).
8. KRISTEN CROSSETT ET AL., NAT’L OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., POP-
ULATION TRENDS ALONG THE COASTAL UNITED STATES: 1980–2008 7, 14, 18, 20
(2004), available at https://aamboceanservice.blob.core.windows.net/oceanservice-
prod/programs/mb/pdfs/coastal_pop_trends_complete.pdf. In 2003, the national aver-
age population density was ninety-eight persons per square mile. Id. at 7. The popula-
tion densities of the Gulf of Mexico, Southeast, and Northeast coastal counties were
164, 224, and 641 persons per square mile, respectively. Id. at 14, 18, 20.
9. See Ashley C. Freeman & Walker S. Ashley, Changes in the U.S. Hurricane
Disaster Landscape: The Relationship Between Risk and Exposure, 88 NAT. HAZARDS
659, 663–67 (2017) (analyzing housing unit data within 50-kilometer increments from
the coast and concluding that “[housing unit] density and subsequent growth in that
density near the coastline is aligning more people and their property with the risks
from tropical cyclone hazards—including hurricane induced storm surge and winds —
which could cause more frequent and higher magnitude disasters in the future”).
10. Tim Doggett, The Growing Value of U.S. Coastal Property at Risk, AIR (Apr.
23, 2015), http://www.air-worldwide.com/Publications/AIR-Currents/2015/The-Grow
ing-Value-of-U-S—Coastal-Property-at-Risk/ [https://perma.cc/PBA7-NCCP].
11. Id. (noting the percentage of insured value in coastal counties in the states of
New York and Texas as 62% and 26%, respectively). The total value of coastal prop-
erty in New York is $2.92 trillion, and the numbers for Florida and Texas (the second
and third largest by number on the Gulf and East Coasts) are $2.86 trillion and $1.18
trillion, respectively. Id.
12. Kevin E. Trenberth et al., Hurricane Harvey Links to Ocean Heat Content and
Climate Change Adaptation, 6 EARTH’S FUTURE 730, 739 (2018) (citing research and
concluding that “a warming ocean will facilitate more [tropical cyclone] activity and
more rainfall and flooding”). Post-Harvey research on the extent to which that hurri-
cane’s record rainfall is attributable to global warming has set the percentage, de-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 4 15-FEB-19 10:24
394 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
causing sea levels to rise,13 which leads to more severe coastal flood-
ing when intense storms make landfall.14 As the storm risk increases,
human behavior is adding to the exposure. One provider of catastro-
phe risk-modeling software and consulting services predicts that total
values insured will double every decade in U.S. coastal areas due to
growing residential and commercial density and increasing construc-
tion expenses.15
pending on the study, in a range of roughly 15–40%. If the number were 35%, this
would mean that climate change increased Harvey’s rainfall totals by roughly 15 in-
ches, an increase that led to enormous additional devastation. Id. Whether ocean
warming increases the number of hurricanes that form is less well understood, but the
link between ocean warming and intensity is clear: “We thus expect [tropical cyclone]
intensities to increase with warming, both on average and at the high end of the scale,
so that the strongest future storms will exceed the strength of any in the past.” Sobel
et al., Human Influence on Tropical Cyclone Intensity, 353 SCI. 242, 242 (2016). Water
vapor is the fuel for hurricanes. ALAN P. TRUJILLO & HAROLD V. THURMAN, ESSEN-
TIALS OF OCEANOGRAPHY 185 (8th ed. 2005) (“Tropical cyclones begin as low-pres-
sure cells that break away from the equatorial low-pressure belt and grow as they pick
up heat and energy for the warm ocean. Surface winds feed moisture (in the form of
water vapor) into the storm. When water evaporates, it stores tremendous amounts of
latent heat of evaporation, which is released as latent heat of condensation when the
water vapor condenses to form liquid water (rain). The release of vast amounts of
water’s latent heat of condensation powers tropical cyclones.”).
13. See, e.g., ARCTIC MONITORING & ASSESSMENT PROGRAMME, SNOW, WATER,
ICE AND PERMAFROST IN THE ARCTIC: SUMMARY FOR POLICY-MAKERS 4 (2017),
available at https://www.amap.no/documents/doc/Snow-Water-Ice-and-Permafrost.-
Summary-for-Policy-makers/1532 (“The loss of land-based ice has accelerated in re-
cent decades. Since at least 1972, the Arctic has been the dominant source of global
sea-level rise. [70%] of the Arctic’s contribution to sea-level rise comes from Green-
land, which on average lost 375 gigatons of ice per year—equivalent to a block of ice
measuring 7.5 kilometers or 4.6 miles on all sides—from 2011 to 2014.”). See generally
Sea Level Rise Viewer, OFFICE FOR COASTAL MGMT., https://coast.noaa.gov/dig-
italcoast/tools/slr.html (last visited June 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/HH3M-A4WP]
(depicting sea level rise scenarios for U.S. coastal locations).
14. Mir Emad Mousavi et al., Global Warming and Hurricanes: The Potential Im-
pact of Hurricane Intensification and Sea Level Rise on Coastal Flooding, 104 CLI-
MATIC CHANGE 575, 577–78 (2011). Coupled with coastline subsidence, the problem is
further exacerbated. See, e.g., Daniel Glick, The Big Thaw, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC,
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/global-warming/big-thaw/ (last vis-
ited June 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/Y3K6-36PM] (“In southern Louisiana, coasts are
literally sinking by about three feet (a meter) a century, a process called subsidence.
A sinking coastline and a rising ocean combine to yield powerful effects. It’s like
taking the global sea-level-rise problem and moving it along at fast-forward.”).
15. AIR, THE COASTLINE AT RISK: 2013 UPDATE TO THE ESTIMATED INSURED
VALUE OF U.S. COASTAL PROPERTIES 3 (2013), available at https://www.air-world-
wide.com/publications/white-papers/documents/the-coastline-at-risk-2013. A case-in-
point is the 1926 Great Miami Hurricane that crossed southern Florida, entered the
Gulf, and then made landfall again in Pensacola before crossing coastal Mississippi
and Louisiana. See Great Miami Hurricane of 1926, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://
www.weather.gov/mfl/miami_hurricane (last visited June 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/
2AXG-4FA7]. At the time, the City of Miami and the surrounding area were develop-
ing rapidly, and despite the fact that the city had a Weather Bureau Office, little
advance warning was given to a population largely unaccustomed to such storms; 372
people died. Id. If the 1928 hurricane were to repeat itself today, economic losses
would be approximately $140–157 billion, larger than any hurricane disaster to date.
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When discussing risk, numeracy is important, and small sample
sizes—both in numbers and years—are problematic. But it is impossi-
ble to look at changes in the lists of the costliest catastrophes over the
past decade and fail to conclude that a major problem confronts us.
As of 2018, of the ten largest catastrophes in U.S. history in terms of
insured losses, eight were hurricanes, seven had occurred since 2000,16
and three of them, all among the six largest, occurred in 2017.17  If
Roger A. Pielke et al., Normalized Hurricane Damage in the United States: 1900–2005,
9 NAT. HAZARDS REV. 29, 35 (normalizing damage to 2005 conditions).
16. See Facts + Statistics: U.S. Catastrophes, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/
fact-statistic/facts-statistics-us-catastrophes (last updated Dec. 7, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/N6KM-D3EL] (listing seven post-2000 hurricanes—Katrina 2005; Maria
2017; Irma 2017; Sandy 2012; Harvey 2017; Ike 2008; Wilma 2005; the pre-2000 hurri-
cane on the list is Andrew 1992; the remaining two are the 9/11/01 attacks and the
1994 Northridge, California earthquake).
17. See Billion-Dollar Weather, supra note 5 (listing, in order, in CPA-adjusted
dollars, Katrina 2005, $165.0 billion; Harvey 2017, $127.5 billion; Maria 2017, $91.8
billion; Sandy 2012, $72.2 billion; Irma 2017, $51.0 billion). But see Facts + Statistics:
U.S. Catastrophes, supra note 16 (indicating that when estimates become final, Maria
will be the second-costliest hurricane in U.S. history, Irma will be the fourth, and
Harvey will be the sixth). Moody’s estimates that total economic losses were Harvey,
$133.5 billion; Maria, $120 billion; and Irma, $84.2 billion. See Leslie Scism & Erin
Ailworth, Moody’s Pegs Florence’s Economic Cost at $38 Billion to $50 Billion, WALL
ST. J. (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/moodys-pegs-florences-economic-
cost-at-38-billion-to-50-billion-1537572161 [https://perma.cc/7K3B-K94L]. When loss
figures are finalized for the 2018 season, Hurricanes Florence and Michael may be
intermingled on this the foregoing list. See id. Before Hurricane Andrew, which made
landfall near Homestead, Florida in 1992, the most damaging hurricane in U.S. his-
tory was Hurricane Hugo, which made landfall north of Charleston, South Carolina in
1989 and caused what would in 2017 be $14 billion of damage. See COSTLIEST U.S.
TROPICAL CYCLONE TABLES UPDATED, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR. (2018) [hereinafter
COSTLIEST TABLE], available at https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/news/UpdatedCostliest.pdf;
Hurricane Hugo, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://www.weather.gov/ilm/hurricanehu
go (last updated Sept. 21, 2014) [https://perma.cc/U65W-KKKL]; Hurricanes in His-
tory, NAT’L HURRICANE CTR., https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/outreach/history/ (last vis-
ited June 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/AUW8-ZYUW]. Pre-Andrew experts thought
that the maximum damage that could be caused by a hurricane was about $14 billion
(in current dollars). Hurricane Andrew was transformational in that it was the first
major hurricane to hit a highly-developed coastline and, with $47.8 billion in total cost
(in current dollars), was the costliest natural disaster in U.S. history at the time. See
COSTLIEST TABLE, supra. More shocking is that the eye of Andrew was a glancing
blow for Miami, which would have produced losses roughly four times those actually
incurred if it had been a direct hit on downtown Miami. Ryan Yousefi, 100-Year Hur-
ricane Could Cost $250 Billion if It Hit Miami, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Apr. 16, 2015),
http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/100-year-hurricane-could-cost-250-billion-if-it-
hit-miami-7572520 [https://perma.cc/8ERA-4AM2] (“In 1992, Andrew made landfall
south of Miami near Homestead, the final bill to fix the damages ended up being
around $15 billion in insured losses but, had Andrew struck just 50 miles north of
Homestead, the losses would have been four-times that, or nearly $60 billion at the
time.”). With the new understanding taught by Andrew, experts began modeling the
next “big one” without thinking about the possibility of a series of smaller hurricanes
hitting in quick succession. See PATRICIA JONES KERSHAW & BYRON MASON, LES-
SONS LEARNED BETWEEN HURRICANES: FROM HUGO TO CHARLEY, FRANCES, IVAN,
AND JEANNE 5–6 (2005), available at https://www.nap.edu/read/11528/chapter/2#5
(“Floridians experienced . . . ‘hurricane fatigue[,]’” and state resources were over-
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measured in terms of insured losses, Hurricane Harvey will rank as
the sixth costliest disaster in U.S. history, which understates the total
destruction of this storm because it presented as a flood event rather
than a wind event.18 Only 20% of properties that suffered flood dam-
age during Harvey were insured.19 In terms of total economic losses—
insured and uninsured—Harvey rivals the losses caused by Hurricane
Katrina in 2005, which is likely to remain the costliest catastrophe in
U.S. history, at least until the next hurricane season is over. Two hurri-
canes in the 2018 season—Florence and Michael—were so severe that
they may reorder these lists, which only underscores the enormity of
the problem squarely in our midst.20
If one adds the Pacific coastal counties, which have a tsunami expo-
sure due to the earthquake risk in that area,21 to the counties on the
whelmed after being stretched thin for so long responding to the four smaller hurri-
canes). In 2004 and 2005, eight hurricanes—Charley, Frances, Ivan, Jeanne, Dennis,
Katrina, Rita, and Wilma—hit Florida. While none was nearly as strong as Andrew,
their cumulative impact was greater than Andrew’s. See COSTLIEST TABLE, supra. By
one calculation, one out of every five homes in Florida suffered some damage in at
least one of the eight hurricanes. Tom Gallagher, We Must Improve Property Insur-
ance Options, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT (Apr. 16, 2006), https://www.myfloridacfo.
com/pressoffice/Newsletter/2006/041706/April_1706ALT2.htm [https://perma.cc/522S-
TQRP].
18. As of August 2018, overall insurers have paid more than $19 billion for Har-
vey-related claims. 13th Annual Hurricane Tour Returns to Texas Coast, INS. COUNCIL
TEX. (Aug.17, 2018) https://www.insurancecouncil.org/4DCGI/cms/review.html?Ac
tion=CMS_Document&DocID=639&MenuKey=123[https://perma.cc/7MF4-RU6T].
The number may rise to the vicinity of $30 billion. See RMS Estimates Hurricane
Harvey Insured Losses From Wind, Storm Surge and Inland Flood Damage Will Be
Between USD $25 and $35 Billion, RMS, https://www.rms.com/newsroom/press-re
leases/press-detail/2017-09-09/rms-estimates-hurricane-harvey-insured-losses-from-
wind-storm-surge-and-inland-flood-damage-will-be-between-usd-25-and-35-billion
(last visited June 26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M9LN-6VUY].
19. Heather Long, Where Harvey Is Hitting Hardest, 80 Percent Lack Flood Insur-
ance, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/
2017/08/29/where-harvey-is-hitting-hardest-four-out-of-five-homeowners-lack-flood-
insurance/?utm_term=.9883283e5527 [https://perma.cc/DA7T-9R5D] (“Only 17[%] of
homeowners in the eight counties most directly affected by Harvey have flood insur-
ance policies, according to a Washington Post analysis of Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency data.”).
20. One estimate puts Hurricane Florence’s economic cost at $38–50 billion. See
Scism & Ailworth, supra note 17. Although Hurricane Michael was the most powerful
hurricane to strike the U.S. since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, because it hit an area of
the Florida panhandle relatively less-populated and less-developed than most of the
Gulf Coast, economic losses, though severe, will be less than other storms. One esti-
mate places Michael’s economic losses at $25 billion. See Brian K. Sullivan & Kathe-
rine Chiglinsky, Hurricane Michael’s Cost: $25B With up to $8B in Insured Losses,
CLAIMS J. (Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/southeast/2018/10/12/
287298.htm [https://perma.cc/H3SE-JF5Y]. Insured losses in both storms, as with Har-
vey, may not be especially severe because most of the economic loss was uninsured
flood loss.
21. See PAULA K. DUNBAR & CRAIG S. WEAVER, NAT’L TSUNAMI HAZARD MITI-
GATION PROGRAM, UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES NATIONAL TSUNAMI HAZARD
ASSESSMENT: HISTORICAL RECORD AND SOURCES FOR WAVES – UPDATE 2, available
at https://nws.weather.gov/nthmp/documents/Tsunami_Assessment_2016Update.pdf
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Maine-Texas coastline, 123.3 million people, according to the 2010
census, which constitutes 39% of the nation’s population, live in high-
risk coastal counties.22 This number is expected to increase by eleven
million in the 2020 census.23 Because people have demonstrated an
affinity for occupying land on or near the coasts, this population
growth will almost certainly increase the amount and values of prop-
erty at risk along the coasts as well.
If hurricanes were the only major disaster hazard in the country, we
would have plenty of reason for grave concern, but that is not the
situation.24 Global climate change, which adds teeth to hurricanes, has
significant implications for non-coastal areas as well. When increased
atmospheric humidity combines with increased temperatures over
land and a reduced average temperature differential between the
earth’s poles and the equator, more precipitation falls in single large
storms instead of in a series of smaller storms, which leads to increas-
ingly intense cycles of droughts and floods.25 Different areas of the
(noting tsunami hazard for different U.S. regions by reference to historical record and
earthquake probabilities); ROBERT W. CHRISTOPHERSON, GEOSYSTEMS 511 (6th ed.
2006) (“A warning system . . . is in operation for nations surrounding the Pacific,
where the majority of tsunamis occur. A warning is issued whenever seismic stations
detect a significant quake or landslide under water, where it might generate a tsu-
nami.”). A hurricane landfall in southern California is possible, but highly unlikely;
the only known hurricane to make landfall in California occurred in San Diego in
1858. See Sean Breslin, What’s the Likelihood of a Hurricane Hitting California?,
WEATHER CHANNEL (July 21, 2015), https://weather.com/storms/hurricane/news/cali
fornia-hurricane-chances [https://perma.cc/NG2N-PDEV]. The cold waters of the Pa-
cific almost always prevent hurricanes from maintaining intensity all the way to the
West Coast and make it virtually impossible to sustain strength north of southern
California. Id. But these tropical systems can still be intense and cause widespread
destruction along the coast.
22. NOAA, NATIONAL COASTAL POPULATION REPORT: POPULATION TRENDS
FROM 1970 TO 2020 (Mar. 2013), available at https://aamboceanservice.blob.core.wind
ows.net/oceanservice-prod/facts/coastal-population-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/
B54A-TFGZ].
23. Id.
24. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42
U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. (2018), defines “major disaster” as any devastating emergency
resulting from a natural calamity or an accidental or man-caused event. 42 U.S.C.
§ 5122(2) (2018) (“‘Major disaster’ means any natural catastrophe (including any hur-
ricane, tornado, storm, high water, wind-driven water, tidal wave, tsunami, earth-
quake, volcanic eruption, landslide, mudslide, snowstorm, or drought), or, regardless
of cause, any fire, flood, or explosion, in any part of the United States, which in the
determination of the President causes damage of sufficient severity and magnitude to
warrant major disaster assistance under this chapter to supplement the efforts and
available resources of States, local governments, and disaster relief organizations in
alleviating the damage, loss, hardship, or suffering caused thereby.”). The Post-Ka-
trina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 adopts the same definition. 6
U.S.C. § 701(6) (2018).
25. See the Impact of Climate Change on Natural Disasters, EARTH OBSERVA-
TORY, NASA, https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/Features/RisingCost/rising_cost5.php
(last visited June 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/W7RD-VUYS].
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country also face the risk of tsunamis,26 non-hurricane-induced flood-
ing,27 landslides,28 earthquakes,29 wildfires,30 volcanoes,31 tornadoes,32
26. See PAULA K. DUNBAR & CRAIG S. WEAVER, NAT’L TSUNAMI HAZARD MITI-
GATION PROGRAM, UNITED STATES AND TERRITORIES NATIONAL TSUNAMI HAZARD
ASSESSMENT: HISTORICAL RECORD AND SOURCES FOR WAVES – UPDATE 2, https://
nws.weather.gov/nthmp/documents/Tsunami_Assessment_2016Update.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E69Q-P32T] (noting tsunami hazard for different U.S. regions by reference
to historical record and earthquake probabilities).
27. See, e.g., Tim Craig & Angela Fritz, Immense Rains Are Causing More Flash
Flooding, and Experts Say It’s Getting Worse, WASH. POST (June 24, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national/immense-rains-are-causing-more-flash-flooding-
and-experts-say-its-getting-worse/2018/06/24/ [https://perma.cc/ZNY5-KQH8]
(describing increases in observed heavy precipitation events). Obviously, this is also
largely a consequence of local geographic factors. See generally FEMA Flood Map
Service Center: Welcome!, FEMA, https://msc.fema.gov/portal (last visited June 27,
2018) [https://perma.cc/VF34-MZPG] (displaying flood hazard information from the
National Flood Insurance Program by input location).
28. See Landslide Overview Map of the Conterminous United States, USGS, https:/
/pubs.usgs.gov/pp/p1183/figures/map.jpg (last updated Dec. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/
N9M6-2P4N] (showing, at a coarse scale, areas susceptible to landslides). See also
Which States Are Prone to Landslides—And How Can You Prepare?, NBC NEWS
(Mar. 24, 2014), https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/deadly-mudslide/which-states-
are-prone-landslides-how-can-you-prepare-n60761 [https://perma.cc/M5EW-9X8C]
(“Slides can occur in all 50 states, but regions like the Appalachian Mountains, the
Rocky Mountains and the Pacific Coastal Ranges have ‘severe landslide problems,’
according to the USGS.”).
29. See Seismic Hazard Maps and Site-Specific Data, USGS, https://earth-
quake.usgs.gov/hazards/hazmaps/ (last visited June 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JR2R-
7BMN] (showing high hazard areas not only along the west coast of the U.S., but also
in other pockets across the country). “Active seismic regions include the West Coast,
the Wasatch Front of Utah northward into Canada, the Central Mississippi Valley, the
southern Appalachians, and portions of South Carolina, [and] upstate New York
. . . .” CHRISTOPHERSON, supra note 21, at 383.
30. See Learn More About Wildfires, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.national
geographic.com/environment/natural-disasters/wildfires/ (last visited June 27, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/7HSP-5KAL] (noting that “Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Washington,
Colorado, Oregon, and California experience some of the worst conflagrations in the
U.S.”). More than 100,000 wildfires burn four to five million acres of land in the U.S.
each year. Id. See also, supra notes 27–28. Also, increased temperatures over land in
some parts of the country is increasing the number of wildfires and the extent of the
damage caused by them. The consensus of experts is that climate change is one of the
contributing causes to the recent increase in wildfires in the western U.S. See A. L.
Westerling, Warming and Earlier Spring Increase Western U.S. Forest Wildfire Activ-
ity, 313 SCI. 940, 940–41 (2006) (finding an increase in large wildfires in the western
United States beginning in the 1980s associated with increased spring and summer
temperatures and also a wildfire season increase of seventy-eight days, comparing
1970 to 1986 with 1987 to 2003); Chelsea Harvey, Here’s What We Know About Wild-
fires and Climate Change, SCI. AM. (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/heres-what-we-know-about-wildfires-and-climate-change/ [https://
perma.cc/H3GJ-AGUQ] (noting that increased temperatures result in drier fuel for
fires, cause an increased frequency of lightning strikes that start fires, extend the dura-
tion of the fire season, and alter wind patterns that drive fires). In recent years, the
wildfire risk has taken on much greater urgency, especially in California. By mid-
August 2018, the Meocino Complex fire had become the largest wildfire in California
history, with eleven people killed and hundreds of thousands of acres destroyed. See
California Fire Coverage, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/local/california/la-me-
california-fires-blog-htmlstory.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/6F7L-
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C6J4]. Multiple variables are combining in the western states, and especially in Cali-
fornia, to increase the frequency, intensity, and damage of wildfires. One of the most
important variables is population growth, which is pushing suburban growth to the
edges of forested areas. See Priya Krishnakumar & Joe Fox, Why the 2017 Fire Season
Has Been One of California’s Worst, L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/projects/la-
me-california-fire-seasons/ (last updated Dec. 5, 2017) [https://perma.cc/K27R-B875]
(explaining that wildland-urban interface areas are high-risk because of the close
proximity of housing and vegetation). See generally Roger B. Hammer et al., Demo-
graphic Trends, the Wildland–Urban Interface, and Wildfire Management, 22 SOC’Y &
NAT. RES. 777 (discussing the demographic processes leading to an expansion of pop-
ulation in the wildland-urban interface). In these wildland-urban interfaces, emer-
gency officials stress the importance of a “defensible space,” a buffer area that guards
the home from ignition due to nearby burning material, among other construction
techniques and development standards. See NAT’L FIRE PROTECTION ASS’N, COMMU-
NITY WILDFIRE SAFETY THROUGH REGULATION: A BEST PRACTICES GUIDE FOR
PLANNERS AND REGULATORS 20–21 (2013), available at https://www.nfpa.org/-/media/
Files/Public-Education/By-topic/Wildland/WildfireBestPracticesGuide.ashx?la=EN.
In addition, weak forest management practices, including the suppression of natural
fires, for many years have led to the accumulation of flammable underbrush. S. ROSS
GORTE, THE RISING COST OF WILDFIRE PROTECTION 2–3 (2013), available at http://
pagosaspringscdc.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/Rising-Costs-of-Wildfire-Protec
tion-Headwaters.pdf (attributing the accumulation of forest fuels largely to “20th cen-
tury fire suppression policies that sought to eliminate all wildfires” and noting that
“current levels of fuel reduction treatments are inadequate to even stabilize the cur-
rent fuel levels, since forests continue to grow, adding more biomass to the lands”).
Building codes have received more attention in recent years, but older construction
tends to have characteristics that fuel the spread of wildfires once they reach inhab-
ited areas. See, e.g., STEPHEN L. QUARLES ET AL., UNIV. CAL. AGRIC. & NAT. RE-
SOURCES, PUB. NO. 8393, HOME SURVIVAL IN WILDFIRE–PRONE AREAS: BUILDING
MATERIALS AND DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS 13–14 (2010), available at https://anrcata
log.ucanr.edu/pdf/8393.pdf (explaining that deck board choice, deck design, and deck
maintenance can minimize a deck’s exposure to embers and that California requires
minimum performance standards for deck boards on new homes). See also Tim Wal-
lace et al., Three of California’s Biggest Fires Ever Are Burning Right Now, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/08/10/us/california-
fires.html [https://perma.cc/PX59-MQ3G] (noting that “[i]n 2010, California became
one of the few states in the country to adopt a mandatory statewide building code to
help reduce fire risk in wildfire-prone areas”). Addressing the core contributing fac-
tors to the increasing wildfire risk is not easy. For example, as wildfires increase in
frequency and intensity, the priorities for investment within forest management pro-
grams shift as budgets are shifted from programs to improve forest management,
which reduces wildfire risk, to the expenses of firefighting. See OFFICE OF ENVTL.
HEALTH HAZARD ASSESSMENT, CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, INDICATORS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE IN CALIFORNIA 188 (2018), available at https://oehha.ca.gov/media/
downloads/climate-change/report/2018caindicatorsreportmay2018.pdf (“As large
wildfires increase in size and number and the fire season has grown longer, firefight-
ing consumes more of the annual resource management budgets for federal and state
lands that otherwise could be spent on sustainable programs for fuel management and
forest health.”)
31. See U.S. Volcanoes and Current Activity Alerts, USGS, https://volcanoes.usgs
.gov/index.html (last updated Nov. 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/JQ7X-5GZV] (showing
a map of volcanoes and current activity across the western U.S. mainland, Hawaii,
and Alaska). Hawaii’s Kilauea Volcano provides a recent example of the destructive
and disruptive nature of volcanic eruptions; the long-lasting eruption prompted evac-
uations and destroyed hundreds of homes over the course of weeks. “A Lot of Tears”:
Lava Destroys as Many as 700 Homes in Hawaii, CBS NEWS, https://www.cbsnews
.com/news/hawaii-kilauea-volcano-big-island-lava-destroys-as-many-as-700-homes-in-
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 10 15-FEB-19 10:24
400 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
severe thunderstorms and wind,33 hail,34 blizzards and snowfall,35 ice
storms,36 and extreme temperature events.37 Not all of these perils
hawaii/ (last updated June 12, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4D56-TEQ2]. By comparison,
Mount St. Helens erupted in May 1980 in a violently explosive manner, killing fifty-
seven people. See Alan Taylor, Mount St. Helens and the Fear of Not Knowing, AT-
LANTIC (May 18, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2018/05/mt-st-
helens-volcano-before-the-internet/560684/ [https://perma.cc/UD6Z-MGVG] (“It was
preceded by the largest landslide ever recorded. It shortened the volcano by about
1,300 feet, generated a blast heard 200 miles away, and spent nine hours spewing 500
million tons of ash 15 miles into the sky, which then fell across at least 11 states and
parts of Canada.”).
32. See U.S. Tornado Climatology, NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://www.
ncdc.noaa.gov/climate-information/extreme-events/us-tornado-climatology (last vis-
ited June 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/CWL7-F395] (noting an average of 1,253 torna-
does in the U.S. each year). The highest number of tornadoes occur in Tornado
Alley—“a nickname given to an area in the southern plains of the central United
States”—and in Florida. Tornado Alley, NAT’L CTRS. FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://www.
ncdc.noaa.gov/climate-information/extreme-events/us-tornado-climatology/tornado-al
ley (last visited June 27, 2018) [https://perma.cc/8WH2-Q6UK].
33. See Severe Weather 101: Thunderstorm Basics, NAT’L SEVERE STORMS LAB.,
https://www.nssl.noaa.gov/education/svrwx101/thunderstorms/ (last visited June 27,
2018) [https://perma.cc/CKT4-M2ZR] (noting that severe thunderstorms—those with
hail larger than an inch, winds above 57.5 miles per hour, or tornadoes—are most
common from Texas to southern Minnesota).
34. See Jonathan Belles, We’re Coming up on the Peak of Activity in Hail Alley,
WEATHER CHANNEL (May 18, 2018), https://weather.com/storms/severe/news/hail-cli
matology-united-states [https://perma.cc/654F-K65H] (noting that “[s]evere hail oc-
curs most often in a triangular region from west Texas to northwest Missouri to the
western Dakotas”).
35. See Nick Wiltgen, The Snowiest Place in Each State, WEATHER CHANNEL (Oct.
27, 2016), https://weather.com/safety/winter/news/snowiest-places-most-snow [https://
perma.cc/RT5B-VHNN] (identifying the highest snowfall totals over a 30-year period
for each state and noting large differences between regions). The National Weather
Service classifies a “blizzard event” as having “[s]ustained wind or frequent gusts
greater than or equal to 35 mph will accompany falling and/or blowing snow to fre-
quently reduce visibility to less than 1/4 mile for three or more hours.” National
Weather Service Expanded Winter Weather Terminology, NAT’L WEATHER SERV.,
https://www.weather.gov/bgm/WinterTerms (last visited June 27, 2018) [https://
perma.cc/4MQD-EAV6]. The frequency of blizzards is on the rise. Jill S.M. Coleman
& Robert M. Schwartz, An Updated Blizzard Climatology of the Contiguous United
States (1959–2014): An Examination of Spatiotemporal Trends, 56 J. APPLIED METE-
OROLOGY & CLIMATOLOGY 173, 176 (“Seasonal blizzard frequencies displayed a dis-
tinct upward trend, with a more substantial rise over the past two decades.”). Blizzard
occurrence has become more widespread but is most associated with the northern
Great Plains. Id.
36. See Chris Dolce & Jon Erdman, The Nation’s Worst Ice Storms, WEATHER
CHANNEL (Jan. 11, 2017), https://weather.com/storms/winter/news/top-10-worst-ice-
storms-20131205 [https://perma.cc/L3PW-YPVR] (discussing storms across many
states). Ice storms are characterized by “damaging accumulations of ice” that often
result in severe travel dangers. Ice Storm, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., https://forecast.
weather.gov/glossary.php?word=ice%20storm (last visited June 27, 2018) [https://per
ma.cc/8E9J-KSQ7].
37. See Rebecca Lindsey, Influence of Global Warming on U.S. Heat Waves May
Be Felt First in the West and Great Lakes Regions, CLIMATE.GOV (Apr. 2, 2018),
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/featured-images/influence-global-warming-us-
heat-waves-may-be-felt-first-west-and [https://perma.cc/9RGR-V775] (noting heat
wave clusters in the West, Northern Plains, Southern Plains, and Great Lakes regions
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carry a high risk of fatalities, although all carry some risk. The good
news is that only 1.1% of the total U.S. land area is at high mortality
risk due to exposure to two or more natural disaster hazards.38 The
bad news is that more than one-third of the U.S. population lives in
that 1.1% of land area.39 Worse, a majority of the U.S. population is
exposed to at least one major natural disaster hazard, which carries
the potential for widespread destruction of property and life.40 The
combined geographic coverage of these individual natural hazards es-
sentially blankets the U.S. and could potentially impact the entire
population.41 And the frequency and intensity trend lines for natural
disasters generally are not encouraging; 2017 set a record for the cost-
liest year ever for natural disasters, with $306 billion in total damage.42
With the data showing that hurricanes are the most likely and seri-
ous of all of these disasters, we return to Hurricane Harvey.43 No one
living in Texas—especially in the cities of Houston, Port Arthur,
Bridge City, Rockport, Wharton, Conroe, Port Aransas, and Victoria,
or more generally in the counties of Harris, Aransas, Nueces, Jeffer-
son, Orange, Victoria, Calhoun, Matagorda, Brazoria, Galveston, Fort
Bend, Montgomery, and Wharton—needs to be told that the U.S.
needs a better approach to managing hurricane and other natural dis-
aster risk, both in terms of pre-disaster planning and post-disaster re-
covery.44 Texans are not alone, as survivors of Hurricanes Katrina,
over areas with high population densities and highlighting that “more people in the
United States die each year from heat-related illness than any other weather disas-
ter”); Michael J. Allen & Scott C. Sheridan, Spatio-Temporal Changes in Heat Waves
and Cold Spells: An Analysis of 55 U.S. Cities, 37 PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY 189, 203–05
(analyzing extreme cold events over two periods for various U.S. cities and emphasiz-
ing that “[w]ith increasingly mild winters, populations may become desensitized to
cold spells”); Jon Erdman, America’s Coldest Outbreaks, WEATHER CHANNEL (Jan.
17, 2018), https://weather.com/storms/winter/news/america-coldest-outbreaks [https://
perma.cc/7GX4-BCP3].
38. See MAXX DILLEY ET AL., WORLD BANK HAZARD MGMT. UNIT, NATURAL
DISASTER HOTSPOTS: A GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS 9 (2005), available at http://docu
ments.worldbank.org/curated/en/621711468175150317/Natural-disaster-hotspots-A-
global-risk-analysis.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 11 (showing on a map that between 51% and 75% of the U.S. popu-
lation is in the highest risk areas from one or more hazards).
41. See generally Kate Baggaley, Where in the United States Is Nature Most Likely
to Kill You?, POPULAR SCI. (June 14, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/natural-hazard-
risk [https://perma.cc/R5AN-ARW3].
42. Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Extreme Hurricanes and Wildfires Made 2017
the Most Costly U.S. Disaster Year on Record, WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/01/08/hurricanes-wildfires-
made-2017-the-most-costly-u-s-disaster-year-on-record/ [https://perma.cc/H2VU-
AUHR].
43. See supra notes 5–16 and accompanying text.
44. See Audrey Carlsen & K.K. Rebecca Lai, Where Harvey Hit Hardest Up and
Down the Texas Coast, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interac
tive/2017/09/01/us/hurricane-harvey-damage-texas-cities-towns.html [https://perma.cc/
64Z6-TSZ5]; Matt Keyser, Report Highlights Top 20 Areas Hit Hardest by Hurricane
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Sandy, Irma, Maria, Florence, Michael, and others will be quick to
agree. This Article primarily examines hurricane risk through the op-
tic of insurance, but, as the discussion will show, a much larger lens is
needed if we are to have a chance of improving our management of
this enormous, and growing, problem.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT
AND RECOVERY
A. The Current “National Preparedness” Framework
Because natural disasters are so vast in their consequences, strate-
gies to deal with them must be varied, interdependent, and coordi-
nated. The need for national planning to prepare for international
threats has long been understood, but the appreciation of the national
security and welfare implications of catastrophic natural disasters has
developed more recently.45
Although some examples of planning in response to national threats
can be found in the history of World War I,46 the civil defense efforts
during World War II marked the first significant attempt to coordinate
national civil preparedness.47 These efforts continued during the Cold
Harvey, KHOU 11 (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.khou.com/article/weather/harvey/re
port-highlights-top-20-areas-hit-hardest-by-hurricane-harvey/285-493668432 [https://
perma.cc/854C-VNSH].
45. War and terrorism are the primary examples, but the coordinated national re-
sponse to the global Y2K threat and current concerns over election security in re-
sponse to Russian efforts to hack the 2016 domestic elections show that cybersecurity
belongs on this list. See Graham Lanktree, U.S. Government at Risk of “Terrifying”
Hacking Attack, but Trump Won’t Do More to Fix the Problem, NEWSWEEK (July 5,
2017, 11:14 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/trump-wont-raise-hacking-putin-yet-us-
government-massively-vulnerable-says-63206 [https://perma.cc/RH9F-US5P]. Pro-
posed action by the federal government suggests that cybersecurity threats will be
addressed more efficiently in the future. See Lily Hay Newman, DHS Will Shore Up
Cybersecurity for America’s Infrastructure, WIRED (July 31, 2018), https://www.
wired.com/story/dhs-national-risk-management-center/ [https://perma.cc/VTV9-29
HU] (reporting on the proposed creation of a National Risk Management Center and
the DHS Cyber Incident Response Teams Act of 2018).
46. See JAMES F. MISKEL, DISASTER RESPONSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY:
WHAT WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T 41 (2006) (noting that the War Department estab-
lished the first “institutionalized disaster relief program” in 1917 through Special Reg-
ulation Number 67, Regulations Governing Flood Relief Work of the War
Department—these regulations set out “the basic policies that would be applied . . . to
all natural disasters”).
47. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., QUADRENNIAL HOMELAND SECURITY RE-
VIEW REPORT: A STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR A SECURE HOMELAND 11 (2010),
available at https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/qhsr_report.pdf (“The National Secur-
ity Act of 1947 brought together the Department of War and the Department of the
Navy into a single integrated entity that became the Department of Defense. The Act
also created the National Security Council and a position on the President’s staff that
would later become the National Security Advisor. The innovation was to bring to-
gether under one overall concept the consideration of foreign affairs and military pol-
icy, which had been, up until that time, two largely separate governmental domains.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 13 15-FEB-19 10:24
2019] MANAGING HURRICANE RISK 403
War,48 and the rise of terrorism—manifested most vividly in the
World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks49—elevated homeland se-
curity’s prominence among the federal government’s priorities.50 In-
deed, the September 11, 2001 attacks focused the national
preparedness conversation in ways that had not occurred since World
War II.51
It was not, however, until Hurricane Katrina made landfall in the
coastal areas of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama in 2005 that nat-
ural disasters became part of the national preparedness conversa-
tion.52 As Hurricane Katrina came ashore, the lack of effective state
and local planning became obvious; many citizens were unprepared or
unwilling to implement disaster response strategies, and the federal
government’s response was late, disorganized, and frequently ineffec-
tive.53 In direct reaction to these failures, Congress passed the Post-
48. GEORGE D. HADDOW & JANE A. BULLOCK, INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT 2–3 (2d ed. 2006) (noting that state and local authorities played a large
role in emergency management during this period, but also describing the establish-
ment of the Office of Defense Mobilization for efficiently handling resource needs
and the role of the Federal Civil Defense Administration in dispensing technical gui-
dance; these agencies merged in 1958).
49. Attacks on the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 and the World Trade Center in 1993, the
domestic terrorist attack in Oklahoma City in 1995, and the U.S. embassy bombings
in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 heightened civic attention on the potentially cata-
strophic implications of a terrorist attack. See Chris Weller, Startling Maps Show
Every Terrorist Attack Worldwide Over the Last 20 Years, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 1,
2017, 10:16 AM), https://www.businessinsider.com/global-terrorist-attacks-past-20-
years-in-maps-2017-5 [https://perma.cc/26NQ-VJLG]; Historic Timeline, NAT’L
COUNTERTERRORISM CTR., https://www.dni.gov/nctc/timeline.html (last visited Aug.
26, 2018) [https://perma.cc/3W7N-CQ7F].
50.  HOMELAND SEC. NAT’L PREPAREDNESS TASK FORCE, CIVIL DEFENSE AND
HOMELAND SECURITY: A SHORT HISTORY OF NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS
23–25 (2006), available at https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/dhs%20civil%20de
fense-hs%20-%20short%20history.pdf (noting that post-September 11, 2001, “there
was near universal agreement within the Federal government that homeland security
required a major reassessment, increased funding, and administrative
reorganization”).
51. See Kathleen J. Tierney, Recent Developments in U.S. Homeland Security Poli-
cies and Their Implications for the Management of Extreme Events, in HANDBOOK OF
DISASTER RESEARCH 406 (Havida´n Rodrı´guez et al. eds., 2007) (“The creation of the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was perhaps the most visible policy re-
sponse to the events of September 11. The government reorganization that accompa-
nied the formation of DHS was the largest in U.S. history since President Truman
created the Department of Defense in 1947, incorporating all or part of 22 federal
agencies, 40 different federal entities, and approximately 180,000 employees.”).
52. For a discussion of the history of national preparedness planning, see Irwin
Redlener & David A. Berman, National Preparedness Planning: The Historical Con-
text and Current State of the U.S. Public’s Readiness, 1940–2005, 59 J. INT’L AFFAIRS
87 (2006).
53. FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND ET AL., THE FEDERAL RESPONSE TO HURRI-
CANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED 33–50 (2006), available at https://perma-
nent.access.gpo.gov/lps67263/katrina-lessons-learned.pdf (detailing the “week of
crisis” as Hurricane Katrina made landfall and overwhelmed past response efforts
before concluding that “[t]he Federal government’s problems responding to Hurri-
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Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (the “Act”) in 2006.54
In this Act, Congress, among other things, substantially reorganized
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”), gave it new
authority to remedy apparent gaps in local, state, and federal response
efforts, and identified “preparedness, protection, response, recovery,
and mitigation” as FEMA’s five core missions.55 Notably, these five
missions, viewed as a whole, established a federal governmental role
in all phases of a natural disaster, including pre-disaster planning and
preparation, civil protection as a disaster unfolds, and post-disaster
relief.
Under the authority of this Act, President Obama issued “Presiden-
tial Policy Directive 8: National Preparedness,”56 which articulated a
goal of creating “[a] secure and resilient Nation with the capabilities
required across the whole community to prevent, protect against, miti-
gate, respond to, and recover from the threats and hazards that pose
the greatest risk.”57 This directive embraced an integrated, compre-
cane Katrina illustrate greater systemic weaknesses inherent in our current national
preparedness system: the lack of expertise in the areas of response, recovery, and
reconstruction”).
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-09-59R, ACTIONS TO IMPLEMENT
THE POST-KATRINA ACT 2 (2008).
55. The five-part mission language comes from the 2006 statute reforming FEMA
in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. See infra note 60. Today, most policy analysts de-
scribe homeland security in terms of the five missions stated in PPD-8 and which
appear in the 2006 statute: prevention (of the events themselves); protection (of citi-
zens against the events as they occur); mitigation (of the consequences of the events);
response (to the events as they occur); and recovery (in the aftermath of the events).
With terrorism, the national focus is on prevention. With natural disasters, thus far the
national focus has been on after-the-fact response and recovery. Jason Barnosky,
Before the Storm: Shifting Federal Disaster Policy Toward Mitigation, BROOKINGS
(Feb. 19, 2015), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2015/02/19/before-the-storm-
shifting-federal-disaster-policy-toward-mitigation/ [https://perma.cc/4N8J-M5KN].
The 2006 statute marked an important point in the evolution in the understanding of
the elements of emergency management. For many years before the statute, the man-
tra of emergency management was “mitigation, preparedness, response, and recov-
ery.” The George W. Bush administration, responding to heightened focus on
terrorism catastrophes, sought to replace “mitigation” with “prevention.” Congress
did not do this in the 2006 statute, but did add protection to the four factors; obvi-
ously, “protecting” the homeland had much more resonance after the 9/11 attacks.
56. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., PRESIDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE/PPD-8: NA-
TIONAL PREPAREDNESS, available at https://www.dhs.gov/presidential-policy-directive-
8-national-preparedness. See JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RES. SERV., PRESIDENTIAL
POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: BACKGROUND
AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS (2011), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/
R42073.pdf.
57. The 2011 Obama directive retained both “mitigation” and “prevention”
among the five goals, added “protection,” and deleted “preparedness.” The directive
listed these five elements as part of creating a “secure and resilient nation.” Perhaps
because the term “security” has a closer logical nexus to war, terrorism, cyberattacks,
and other similar threats to the homeland, FEMA appears to stress resilience as the
primary objective of its natural disaster relief strategies. See Resilience, FEMA, https:/
/www.fema.gov/resilience (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LR5L-FHSC].
“Resiliance,” however, is also a term emphasized in the mission statements of the
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hensive, “all hazards, capability-based approach” to national
preparedness.58 It recognized that threats to national security come
from a diverse range of hazards, including natural disasters,
pandemics, terrorist acts, accidents—such as dam failures, chemical
spills, and infrastructure failures—and cyber-attacks. The directive
also recognized that the U.S. needs a coherent overarching strategy to
respond to all these hazards.59 Although the nomenclature of national
preparedness has evolved and will continue to do so, the current lexi-
con of catastrophe risk management appears in Figure 1.
Department of Homeland Security, as this term also aptly describes the nation’s prep-
aration for terrorism and other kinds of internationally-based threats. See Resilience,
DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/topic/resilience (last visited Dec. 10,
2018) [https://perma.cc/EDM7-8FJB]. FEMA describes resilience as “a culture of
preparedness through insurance, mitigation, preparedness, continuity, and grant pro-
grams.” Id. Separately, in explaining the National Preparedness Goal, FEMA identi-
fies 32 activities, called “core capabilities,” that “address the greatest risks to the
nation,” and the National Preparedness Goal organizes the thirty-two activities into
“five mission areas,” which are the same five missions in the Obama 2011 policy
directive.
58. U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 3 (1st ed.
2011), available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf. The directive was am-
plified in a report published by the Department of Homeland Security later that year.
See U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL 1 (1st ed. 2011),
available at https://www.fema.gov/pdf/prepared/npg.pdf. The report was modified in
2015. See generally U.S. DEP’T HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS GOAL
(2d ed. 2015), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1443799615171-
2aae90be55041740f97e8532fc680d40/National_Preparedness_Goal_2nd_Edition.pdf.
This directive and efforts to implement it should be viewed as an extension of a his-
tory of national preparedness initiatives dating back to World War II. See Redlener &
Berman, supra note 52.
59. Id.
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FIGURE 1
The Current National Preparedness Framework
for Catastrophe Risk Management
Consistent with the Act and the Obama policy directive, this frame-
work recognizes five core missions in managing catastrophe risks.60
Prevention refers to avoiding or stopping an occurrence; this mission is
most commonly implicated with terrorism and other human-induced
assaults on the country.61 Protection refers to securing or hardening
the means through which a nation defends citizens, property, systems,
networks, and other assets from the effects of such occurrences as
they unfold.62 Mitigation refers to steps a nation takes to lessen the
60. In some discussions, each of these missions is described as a “framework.” For
example, the Congressional Research Service has described the National Prepared-
ness System as involving five “National Planning Frameworks,” which are the same as
the five core missions. See JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42073, PRES-
IDENTIAL POLICY DIRECTIVE 8 AND THE NATIONAL PREPAREDNESS SYSTEM: BACK-
GROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 10 (2011).
61. An example of this is civic education to encourage citizens to report strange
packages left unattended in public spaces, airports, etc.
62. An example of this is retrofitting computer systems, servers, and components
to resist attacks from cyber-hackers.
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impact on people and property of future disasters.63 Response refers
to the actions a nation takes as a disaster unfolds to save lives and
protect property and other assets and to meet human needs in the
aftermath of an occurrence.64 Recovery refers to restoring and re-
building in the aftermath of an occurrence.65 Although the boundaries
among some of these missions are imprecise, they provide a coherent
framework for the discussion and organization of planning, poli-
cymaking, and strategy implementation.
B. Insurance and the National Preparedness Framework
1. Recovery, Prevention, and Mitigation
Insurance is closely related to three of the national preparedness
missions: recovery, prevention, and mitigation. The most obvious con-
nection is recovery; insurance companies pay proceeds to individuals
and firms that suffer losses, and the recipients use these funds to re-
build, rehabilitate, and sometimes relocate. Recovery is the post-event
phase, whereas the decision to purchase insurance is made ex ante as
part of the process of preparing for a possible catastrophe. The timing
of the purchase is related to insurance law’s fortuity requirement,
which holds that insurance cannot be purchased after a loss, once a
loss is in progress, or once it is known that a loss will occur or will
soon begin to occur.66 For individuals with losses and public officials
responsible for rebuilding communities and their infrastructures, in-
surance has an important connection to recovery. When, however, an
individual chooses to purchase insurance, the transaction has a close
nexus to mitigation. The prospective insured is interested in transfer-
ring risk to the insurer by paying a premium in exchange for the in-
surer’s promise to pay recovery expenses if the insured suffers a loss,
so that the insured’s out-of-pocket expenses in the recovery phase will
be reduced. What, at least in theory, makes this exchange feasible and
affordable is the insurer’s ability to pool the insured’s risk with large
numbers of similarly situated insureds. The insurer—with the knowl-
edge afforded by the law of large numbers that not all insureds in the
pool will suffer losses in a given policy term—is able to charge all
insureds in the pool a premium that is a fraction of an insured’s poten-
63. An example of this is retrofitting homes with hurricane shutters and roof
straps to reduce hurricane damage.
64. The activities of first-responders (i.e., police, fire, Coast Guard, National
Guard, etc.) in rescue, temporary relocation, etc. are examples of the implementation
of this mission.
65. Debris removal, loans and grants, permanent relocation assistance, insurance
payments, etc. are examples of implementation of this mission.
66. See ROBERT H. JERRY & DOUGLAS S. RICHMOND, UNDERSTANDING INSUR-
ANCE LAW 368–76 (6th ed. 2018).
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tial total loss, thereby making the insured’s insurance purchase
affordable.67
Insurance is also indirectly related to prevention. The business of
insurance is first and foremost the business of managing risks; insureds
purchase insurance to substitute security for uncertainty, which is a
financial cost that deters us from valuable activities, a psychological
burden, or both. But to the extent individuals and firms can prevent
events that cause loss, they will not need insurance to compensate for
loss. Similarly, to the extent individuals and firms succeed in reducing
the probability that loss-producing events will happen, the insurance
they purchase should cost less. Thus, individuals and firms invest sub-
stantial resources in trying to prevent events that cause loss. The in-
surance industry supports those efforts by studying risks and losses,
educating policyholders about how to reduce risk, and structuring
their products—such as deductibles, copayments, and self-insured re-
tentions—to incentivize policyholders to engage in loss-prevention
activities.
Prevention, if understood as averting the occurrence of the loss-pro-
ducing event itself, is irrelevant as a risk management technique for
natural disasters. It is not yet—and may never be—possible to control
the timing, nature, or magnitude of hurricanes and other natural disas-
ters.68 If, however, prevention is understood as preventing an event’s
consequences from becoming a catastrophe, the concept of prevention
is highly relevant to natural disasters. For example, in almost every
natural disaster situation, putting physical distance between persons
and property and the source of a disaster reduces the risk of loss when
the event occurs. Prevention options exist in some other situations as
well. For example, human negligence sometimes causes wildfires, but
wildfire prevention education has demonstrated net benefits by reduc-
67. This necessitates disaggregation of risk, or the avoidance of correlated risks, so
that all insureds in the pool will not suffer similar losses in the event of a disaster. For
a discussion of the law of large numbers, see id. at 13.
68. There is a possibility that an asteroid strike could end almost all life on the
planet. See Brett Line, Asteroid Impacts: 10 Biggest Known Hits, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC
(Feb. 15, 2013), https://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2013/13/130214-biggest-as
teroid-impacts-meteorites-space-2012da14/ [https://perma.cc/QG3E-WS6R] (catalog-
ing the ten biggest known asteroid impacts). The risk is high if “risk” is defined as the
probability of the occurrence times the magnitude of the loss, while considering cop-
ing capacity. See ULRICH RANKE, NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT: GEOSCI-
ENCES AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 491 (2015); David J. Eicher, Why the Asteroid
Threat Should be Taken Seriously, ASTRONOMY (Apr. 2, 2015), http://www.astron
omy.com/bonus/asteroidday [https://perma.cc/47AM-JC2N]. Modern technology may
prevent the catastrophic event. For a discussion on how spacecraft systems can be
used to prevent impacts, see DETECTING & MITIGATING THE IMPACT OF EARTH-
BOUND NEAR-EARTH OBJECTS INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP, NAT’L SCIENCE &
TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL, NATIONAL NEAR-EARTH OBJECT PREPAREDNESS STRAT-
EGY AND ACTION PLAN 4–5 (2018), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-con
tent/uploads/2018/06/National-Near-Earth-Object-Preparedness-Strategy-and-Action
-Plan-23-pages-1MB.pdf.
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ing the occurrence of some kinds of wildfires.69 Additionally, rain and
snowmelt that cause flooding are uncontrollable, but sometimes wa-
tershed, stream, and river management practices can prevent some
land areas from flooding during these uncontrollable weather events.
When insurers reduce premiums in response to insureds’ efforts to
prevent adverse events or to divert or minimize an event’s conse-
quences, insurance incentivizes investment in prevention.
A related but distinct risk management tool is mitigation—reducing
the magnitude of loss once it occurs. This strategy is so familiar in our
daily lives that most of us overlook its presence: sprinkler systems in
our buildings will not prevent fires from breaking out, but they will
reduce their consequences; seat belts, air bags, and no-crush passenger
compartments will not prevent auto accidents, but they do reduce the
likelihood of injury when an accident occurs; carbon monoxide and
smoke alarms will not prevent furnace malfunctions and house fires,
but they do provide warnings that help save lives. Every kind of natu-
ral disaster is susceptible to loss-reduction strategies. For example,
faulty forest-management practices and antiquated building codes and
zoning regulations magnify the impact of wildfires, and revising or up-
dating these practices and regulations can reduce the amount of wild-
fire loss.70 Building codes can mitigate the impact of earthquakes,71
and early warning systems can reduce the risk to life when the system
spots a tornado.72 Severe hot and cold weather is uncontrollable, but
public and private programs to assist vulnerable populations—the eld-
69. See, e.g., Jeffrey P. Prestermon et al., Net Benefits of Wildfire Prevent Educa-
tion Efforts, 56 FOREST SCI. 181, 188 (2010) (concluding that wildfire education efforts
have statistically significant, beneficial effects on the number of wildfires ignited by
debris burning, campfire escapes, smoking, and children, with a benefits-to-costs ratio
for Florida wildfires from 2002 to 2007 of an average of 35:1).
70. See, e.g., Thomas Curwen, California’s Deadliest Wildfires Were Decades in the
Making, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017, 5:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/local/califor
nia/la-me-fire-perspectives-20171022-story.html [https://perma.cc/3T6M-PTY9]
(describing the position that fire management is a “societal and political problem”
and that part of the solution involves “allowing more controlled burns, and . . . apply-
ing the same citywide codes and zoning requirements to rural subdivisions”).
71. See e.g., NAT’L INST. OF BLDG. SCIS. BLDG. SEISMIC SAFETY COUNCIL, EARTH-
QUAKE-RESISTANT DESIGN CONCEPTS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE NEHRP RECOM-
MENDED SEISMIC PROVISIONS FOR NEW BUILDINGS AND OTHER STRUCTURES 7–11
(2010), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1759-25045-
5477/fema_p_749.pdf (detailing the history of seismic requirements for building codes
and the impact of the federal National Earthquake Hazards Reduction Program on
improvements to today’s building codes).
72. Timothy A. Coleman et al., The History (and Future) of Tornado Warning
Dissemination in the United States, 92 BAMS 567, 568 (2011). See also Mildred F.
Perreault, Does Scary Matter?: Testing the Effectiveness of New National Weather Ser-
vice Tornado Warning Messages, 65 COMM. STUD. 484, 488–89 (describing more re-
cent efforts by the National Weather Service to create more effective warning
messages that “include more frightening information (when appropriate) and more
detail on tornado path and recommended actions”).
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erly or the homeless, for example—can reduce the risk of injury or
death.
Whether the foregoing strategies’ categorization in the national
preparedness lexicon should be prevention or mitigation is arguable;73
regardless, loss-reduction and mitigation strategies are the first lines
of defense against natural disasters. The purchase of insurance enters
the picture only when one of two things happens: either (a) purchasers
exhaust all options for loss reduction and mitigation and none remain
for implementation; or (b) the marginal costs of implementing addi-
tional loss-reduction or mitigation options exceed the costs of
purchasing insurance in markets where such products are available. If
insurance providing compensation for loss is cheaper than the cost of
implementing a loss-reduction or mitigation strategy, the rational eco-
nomic actor will decline to implement the strategy and will purchase
insurance instead.
In an efficient market, price adjustments by the insurer will influ-
ence how much investment insureds make in loss reduction and miti-
gation. An insurance company selling a policy that covers a particular
kind of loss should offer the policyholder a premium reduction if the
policyholder invests in one or more strategies that reduce the amount
of loss that will occur should the loss-producing event happen. If the
premium reduction is more than the cost of implementing the loss-
reduction or mitigation strategy, the rational policyholder should im-
plement the strategy in order to maximize gains. But, if an insurer
offers a premium reduction that is less than the cost of implementing
the loss-reducing or mitigation strategy, the rational policyholder
should decline to invest in the strategy and should purchase insurance
instead. As in any market, price affects the amount of the product
buyers will purchase; in insurance markets, this means that insurance
premiums directly affect insureds’ risk management choices.
Thus, in an efficient market, insurance works hand-in-hand with
loss-prevention strategies to incentivize policyholders to take optimal
steps to reduce the costs of hurricanes and natural disasters. Unfortu-
nately, as discussed in Part III, the risk-management choices made in
today’s markets fall well short of this efficiency ideal.
73. “Prevention” and “mitigation” are difficult concepts to distinguish from one
another. For example, with respect to flood risk, choosing to move from a coastal area
to live on a mesa in the southwest will prevent loss due to flood (or mitigate up to
100%), whereas moving inland from the coast will incrementally reduce the risk of
hurricane-caused flooding in proportion to the distance moved if all other variables
are held constant. An alternative possible distinction is as follows: A prevention strat-
egy involves measures that keep people distant from flood waters, e.g., spatial plan-
ning and water-flow management, whereas a mitigation strategy involves measures
that resist or accommodate the water, such as building codes that adapt a building to
withstand the effects of flooding, e.g., building a structure on “stilts” so that flood
water flows underneath it without destroying the first floor, at least if water levels stay
below what is accommodated by the structural design.
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2. Ex Ante Risk Management and Ex Post Damage Relief
The five core missions in the modern national preparedness frame-
work relate to each other sequentially: prevention, mitigation, and
protection are pre-disaster—ex ante—activities; response activities are
concurrent with the disaster; and recovery refers to post-disaster—ex
post—activities.74 In other words, individuals and firms can either an-
ticipate possible loss before it happens and act proactively to address
the risk, wait for loss to happen and then respond to the conse-
quences, or do some combination of both.
Ex ante strategies anticipate loss and seek to reduce either the like-
lihood of a loss-causing event or the magnitude of a loss. Individuals
and firms engage in such activities, but so does government through
direct investments and tools that require or incentivize private actors
to do so. For example, government may require or incentivize ex ante
strategies through tax incentives, direct subsidies (or cost-sharing),
zoning regulations, land use planning rules, and building codes. These
interventions are consistent with a long list of risk management strate-
gies that government deploys throughout the economy, such as, for
example, limited liability laws that cap losses for those taking en-
trepreneurial risks or provide valued goods and services in private
markets; monetary policies and deposit insurance that reduce the risk
of banking failures and associated volatilities in the economy; bank-
ruptcy rules that shift default risk from debtors to creditors to prevent
or ameliorate the financial collapse of individuals and firms; and prod-
uct liability laws that manage the risk of product-caused injuries.75
Strategies that provide compensation to those who suffer the conse-
quences of a loss-producing event are ex post damage relief tech-
niques. Private insurance falls into this category, and government is
also a major contributor to ex post compensation through direct insur-
ance programs, such as flood insurance.76 In some settings, govern-
ment regulations set the parameters for coverage provided by private
insurers, which has the effect of determining compensation for injuries
74. An early use of the ex ante-ex post framework to describe national prepared-
ness planning can be found in Howard Kunreuther, Mitigating Disaster Losses
Through Insurance, 12 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 171 (1996).
75. For more information on this, see DAVID A. MOSS, WHEN ALL ELSE FAILS:
GOVERNMENT AS THE ULTIMATE RISK MANAGER (2002).
76. Other examples include the Social Security system, see id. at 180–215; Medi-
care, see MEDICARE.GOV, https://www.medicare.gov/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/U6HE-8XGN]; Medicaid, see MEDICAID.GOV, https://www.medi
caid.gov/ [https://perma.cc/JH7N-96VB]; and crop insurance, see 5 ROBERT H. JERRY,
II, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 56 (2018). The risks of
lacking sufficient income in old age or under conditions of disability are ameliorated
by the Social Security program. The risks of lacking sufficient assets for medical and
hospital expenses in old age or under conditions of indigency are ameliorated by the
Medicare and Medicaid programs.
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and losses.77 Finally, government-provided disaster relief is a classic
example of ex post risk management.78
Thus, strategies for risk management sort into ex ante and ex post
categories. The aims of ex ante risk management strategies are to pre-
pare for possible loss by preventing it where possible and mitigating
its effects when encountered. The aims of ex post strategies are to en-
able recovery from the consequences already suffered. Insurance can
also be understood as a method of ex ante preparation for ex post
consequences. In an efficient market, insurance also serves to incen-
tivize private investment in mitigation, thereby helping fulfill impor-
tant ex ante goals. For ex post strategies, both insurance and disaster
aid enable individuals and firms to rebuild or replace damaged prop-
erty, to recover lost revenue streams, and to return to business or life
as usual.
3. Private Versus Public Risk Management
As indicated in the prior discussion, risk management activities—in
addition to being categorized as ex ante or ex post—can be categorized
based on whether they originate in the private or the public sector.79
On the private side, individuals and firms prepare for disasters by in-
vesting in loss prevention and mitigation and by funding post-disaster
recovery, either by purchasing insurance or by creating reserves for
recovery (essentially self-insuring). Natural disaster risk management
also occurs in the public sector. Although government often acts di-
rectly through various agencies to manage risk, it also acts indirectly
through the influence it exercises on private actors.
In the private sector, the two insurance products most relevant to
natural disaster losses are property insurance and business interrup-
tion insurance. Property insurance on buildings, homes, motor vehi-
cles, and personal property can be obtained in homeowners, renters,
and automobile policies, and some niche products, such as personal
property floaters. Property insurance on commercial buildings and
other kinds of business property is available in products tailored to
commercial customers. Intangible assets are increasingly important in
the modern e-economy, and a number of specialty products are now
available to protect these kinds of assets. Business interruption insur-
ance is an often overlooked but vitally important product in the com-
mercial world. Business interruption insurance replaces income lost
due to damage or loss of property on which the production of income
depends. Property insurance replaces or repairs damage to tangible
77. Workers compensation insurance is an example. See MOSS, supra note 75, at
152–79.
78. Id. at 253–64.
79. For a discussion of public versus private sector roles, see Carolyn Kousky &
Howard Kunreuther, Defining the Roles of the Public and Private Sector in Risk Com-
munication, Risk Reduction, and Risk Transfer, RESOURCES FUTURE 1, 1 (2017).
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property, but often the far greater losses are the interruption of reve-
nue streams when business activity ceases because property on which
the activity depends is destroyed or damaged.
A premise of the U.S. economic system is that an unregulated mar-
ketplace is the default, and the government intervenes only when the
market fails to achieve valued goals or make socially acceptable allo-
cations. The business of insurance is subject to this same premise, and
much of the history of governmental intervention in insurance mar-
kets involves efforts to shore up private markets when they fail.80 Yet
the U.S. experience with hurricanes and other natural disasters dem-
onstrates the incompleteness of the private market solution for ex post
risk management. Moreover, that government should intervene after
natural disasters strike and provide direct financial assistance to citi-
zens has long been a deeply held expectation of the public.81 Thus, at
numerous points in the natural disaster risk management-recovery ma-
trix, government intervention has lacked effectiveness, efficiency, and
coherence.
C. The Natural Disaster Risk Management-Recovery Matrix
With risk management activities sorting along two dimensions—ex
ante risk management versus ex post recovery and private efforts ver-
sus public efforts—essentially four different categories of risk man-
agement activities exist. These categories are interdependent; an
investment or activity in one affects the others. Government has its
own ex ante and ex post activities but can also seek to influence or
control decisions made in the private categories. These relationships
are illustrated in Figure 2.
80. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 66, at 59.
81. See David A. Moss, Courting Disaster? The Transformation of Federal Disaster
Policy Since 1803, in THE FINANCING OF CATASTROPHE RISK 307, 333, 343 (Kenneth
A. Froot ed., 1999).
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FIGURE 2
The Risk Management-Recovery Matrix82
82. Notes: a. To the extent private investment in prevention and mitigation occurs,
public investment is unnecessary. In reverse, public investment in prevention and
mitigation will deter private investment if the private sector expects public investment
to occur.
b. In the bridge, government can deploy means of incentivizing, subsidizing, and
requiring private investments in mitigation and prevention.
c. To the extent private insurance is supplied and purchased, and/or private disaster
assistance is supplied, government insurance and directly-provided disaster relief is
unnecessary. To the extent government insurance and/or disaster relief is provided,
private insurance is unnecessary. Also, the expectation of disaster relief may deter the
purchase of private insurance.
d. Government regulation of private market coverage terms, price, and eligibility to
purchase affects the availability of private insurance.
e. Government regulation of private market policy limits in the private market and
government provision of excess layers of coverage influences the availability of
insurance in the private market.
f. In the private sector, choices are made as to whether to invest in prevention and
mitigation practices or to transfer risk to insurers in private markets. Doing either
reduces the need for investment in the other.
g. Government chooses whether to invest in prevention and mitigation on the one
hand, or to provide insurance and/or disaster relief on the other. A choice to invest in
one reduces the need to invest in the other.
h. Private sector decisions to invest in prevention or mitigation reduce the need for
the government to provide ex post insurance and/or disaster relief. Availability of
government insurance and/or disaster relief can deter private investment in
prevention and mitigation.
i. Public investments in prevention and mitigation can reduce the need for private
sector purchases of insurance. To the extent private insurance is available and
purchased in private markets, direct public investment in prevention and mitigation
might be reduced.
j. To the extent government regulation of private insurance markets influences private
market insurance availability, private market decisions regarding how much to invest
in prevention and mitigation are affected.
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In a perfect risk management world, markets send clear signals to
market participants, and these participants react by always making
benefit-optimizing decisions. Where tradeoffs exist in the returns from
different choices in the matrix, market participants will identify and
implement the best choices. This, however, is not how the world actu-
ally functions. First, ex ante and ex post risk management activities are
not perfectly coordinated.  Underinvestment in pre-disaster preven-
tion and mitigation leads to failure to prevent or reduce loss, which
results in excessive reliance on post-disaster compensation. Second,
within the private sector, investments in loss prevention and mitiga-
tion are not perfectly coordinated with insurance purchases. Market
signals are often inaccurate, imperfectly communicated, and incor-
rectly interpreted.  This prevents market participants from making op-
timal choices about when to cease further investments in prevention
and mitigation and to shift to risk transference through the insurance
purchases.  Third, the purchase of private insurance is not perfectly
coordinated with government insurance and public expenditures to
subsidize private insurance purchases, and government insurance or
subsidies sometimes disrupt private markets or exceed what is neces-
sary to relieve market failure. Fourth, investment in pre-loss preven-
tion and mitigation and pre-loss insurance—both private and public—
is not perfectly coordinated with investment in post-loss disaster re-
lief. Too little ex ante investment results in more costly expenditures
for ex post relief. Fifth, within the prevention and mitigation facets,
the mix of private spending and government subsidy is not perfectly
coordinated within the prevention and mitigation areas of the matrix.
There are other tradeoffs in the matrix.83 Finding the optimal bal-
ance in each of these intersections is complicated: the empirical mea-
surements needed to identify the points of perfect coordination are
difficult to make, and in some instances, are probably impossible to
confidently make with accuracy. Yet there is no escaping the matrix.
It is within this complex set of relationships where the public policy
choices appear and where public and private actors make the deci-
sions that determine the nation’s preparedness for hurricanes and
other natural disasters.
III. HURRICANES, THE MATRIX, AND NATURAL DISASTER
MISMANAGEMENT
As explained above, multiple points exist within the matrix where
different kinds of natural disaster risk management strategies inter-
sect. At each intersection, a range of potential outcomes exist depend-
83. For a comparative analysis of the tradeoffs in national preparedness policy, see
Cathy Suykens et al., Dealing With Flood Damages: Will Prevent, Mitigation, and Ex
Post Compensation Provide for a Resilient Triangle?, 21 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 1 (2016)
(discussing natural flood disaster policy in Belgium, Netherlands, England, and
France).
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ing on the chosen risk management strategy. This Section explores
particularly challenging intersections in the matrix where four defi-
ciencies in current approaches and strategies are especially salient: (1)
underinvestment in prevention; (2) failures in private insurance mar-
kets; (3) ineffective government efforts to support private insurance
markets; and (4) shortfalls in federal disaster relief programs. An im-
portant lesson of the matrix is that any effort to deal with any one of
these challenges affects the others, which means that none of these
problems can be effectively addressed in isolation.
A. Underinvestment in Prevention
Arguably the most important intersection in the matrix, and the one
most confounding to current national preparedness policy, is the inter-
section where ex ante prevention and mitigation investments meet ex
post recovery expenditures. To the extent investments in prevention
and mitigation are successful, the need for post-event disaster relief
and compensation declines. Unfortunately, current investments in
prevention and mitigation are, by any fair measure, too low, which
directly and significantly inflates the need for ex post recovery
expenditures.
Part of the reason underinvestment in pre-loss prevention and miti-
gation occurs is directly related to the inherent proclivity of humans to
underestimate hurricane risk.84 Multiple cognitive biases contribute to
these errors. First, humans tend to undervalue risks that are abstract
or common and overvalue risks that are easily imaginable, horrific,
beyond one’s control, and widely publicized in the media.85 As this
heuristic manifests itself with hurricanes, humans tend to overestimate
their preparedness, underestimate the probability that the disaster will
affect them personally, and underestimate the scope of the potential
damage.86 This error not only produces underinvestment but also
tends to cause public programs that encourage preparedness to
underperform.87
84. Although this discussion is limited to hurricanes, most of the observations
made in this discussion are equally pertinent to other kinds of natural disasters.
85. For more discussion, see GLYNIS M. BREAKWELL, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RISK
(2007); BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN
AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (2002).
86. See FM GLOBAL, FLIRTING WITH NATURAL DISASTERS: WHY COMPANIES
RISK IT ALL 7 (2010), available at http://www.fmglobal-touchpoints.co.uk/wp-content/
uploads/2012/04/Flirting-with-Natural-Disasters-Why-Companies-Risk-It-All_Flirting
_with_natural_disasters.pdf. This heuristic is also manifest when investments in loss
mitigation are made; a tendency exists to overestimate the effectiveness of the mitiga-
tion efforts and allow excessive development in areas mistakenly assumed to be pro-
tected, which itself can lead to greater future loss. See Howard Kunreuther, Disaster
Mitigation and Insurance: Learning From Katrina, 604 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 208, 208 (2006).
87. See Amy K. Donahue et al., Ready or Not? How Citizens and Public Officials
Perceive Risk and Preparedness, 44 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 89S, 107S (2013).
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Second, past experience shows that both public and private actors
are slow to anticipate evolving patterns of risk. For example, despite
narratives of massive and destructive hurricane events in the first half
of the 20th century, Hurricane Camille’s landfall along the Missis-
sippi-Alabama-Louisiana coast in 1969 shattered assumptions about
the potential maximum size and power of a hurricane.88 In essence, an
event like Camille had not been previously imagined and did not exist
as a possibility in the public’s consciousness. After the storm, the pre-
vailing assumption became that Camille represented the upper limit of
strength that a hurricane could carry, but Hurricane Andrew’s de-
structive impact in Florida in 1992 demonstrated the fallacy of this
assumption. With a new understanding provided by Andrew,
preparedness efforts focused on a recurrence of a similarly-sized hur-
ricane in a populated area. But neither experts nor the public
imagined a situation in which multiple smaller storms would strike in
relatively rapid sequence in the same general geographic area with
total damage as large or larger than that of a single storm. Thus, when
the cumulative impact of the eight hurricanes that made landfall in
Florida and other Gulf Coast states in the 2004 and 2005 seasons
vastly exceeded the damage that Andrew caused, the frame for under-
standing maximum impacts from hurricanes adjusted once again.89
The future is destined to reveal a new, currently unimagined hurricane
event for which the public is not prepared.
Third, once public and private actors identify new or changed risks,
they are slow to react to them. Many individuals and some firms have
short economic horizons and do not choose investments that need a
long time to earn returns. For example, a homeowner who expects to
live in a home for only a few years before selling and relocating will
correctly reason that the homeowner will not recoup a major invest-
ment in flood mitigation in the future sales price, and thus the mitiga-
tion investment is not cost-effective.90 Public officials behave
similarly. For example, although officials knew of the possibility of a
88. In new construction and in areas previously devastated by hurricanes, stricter
building codes proved effective following recent hurricanes. See, e.g., Mary Shanklin,
Florida Building Codes Thwarted Hurricane Damage, Report Shows, ORLANDO SEN-
TINEL (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.orlandosentinel.com/classified/realestate/os-bz-flori
da-home-construction-20180319-story.html [https://perma.cc/7DRP-W4LW]. Florida
is the state with the largest number of mobile homes; according to the Manufacturing
Housing Institute, 600,000 out of the 820,000 mobile homes in Florida are old models
“not constructed to withstand hurricane-level winds.” Danielle Paquette, Florida Has
828,000 Mobile Homes: Less Than a Third Were Built to Survive a Hurricane, WASH.
POST (Sep. 12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/12/flori
da-has-828000-mobile-homes-only-half-are-insured/ [https://perma.cc/MXY7-WCAC].
89. See Billion-Dollar Weather, supra note 5 (listing Hurricanes Ivan, Wilma, Rita,
Charley, Frances, Jeanne, Dennis, and Katrina as making landfall in Florida in 2004
and 2005).
90. Before the Great Recession, the national average home tenure was less than
five years. As of 2016, the average tenure had risen, but only to 7.94 years. Kelsey
Ramirez, ATTOM: Homeownership Tenure Hits Record High, HOUSINGWIRE (Nov.
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hurricane disaster in New Orleans since at least Hurricane Betsy in
1965, it was more convenient for public officials to hope for good luck
than construct more ambitious disaster response plans.91 In addition,
normal election-cycle turnover in local government made it expedient
for officeholders to defer investments in pre-event mitigation and
punt such efforts to their successors—a cycle that repeated itself
through the years.92 Thus, Hurricane Katrina was not so much a sur-
prise as it was a failure to prepare for a known risk.93
Fourth, innumeracy compounds slow reaction to known events; in
other words, individuals, firms, and regulators tend to make mathe-
matically incorrect assumptions about the frequency of natural disas-
ter events. The occurrence of the so-called 100-year flood does not
mean, as many assume, that close to ninety-nine years of safety will
follow the 100-year event; rather, the label means that there is a 1%
chance that a flood of this size will happen in any given year.94 The
misinterpretation of this common description of flood events leads
some individuals and firms to underinvest in mitigation and some-
times to drop whatever insurance coverage they might already carry.
Moreover, the descriptive benchmarks are often inaccurate; the data
and science underlying these benchmarks often change, thereby caus-
ing the benchmarks—even if correctly interpreted—to under-predict
the likelihood of flooding events.95 Another problem arises when indi-
viduals and firms make the rational choice to gather information
about the magnitude of natural disaster risk because they are likely to
find that experts disagree. This uncertainty discourages loss mitigation
investment. Further, the optimism heuristic suggests that the actor will
select the most favorable expert opinion to guide one’s loss-reduction
17, 2016), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/38554-attom-homeownership-tenure-
hits-record-high [https://perma.cc/5CMT-FX9H].
91. See Mike Scott, Remembering Hurricane Betsy, a New Orleans Nightmare,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (May 31, 2017), https://www.nola.com/300/2017/05/hurricane_betsy_
new_orleans_05312017.html [https://perma.cc/9BAM-DLNJ].
92. See Roger D. Congleton, The Story of Katrina: New Orleans and the Political
Economy of Catastrophe, 127 PUB. CHOICE 17 (2006).
93. See Edward Richards, Hurricane Katrina—Was Flooding Really a Surprise?,
LSU LAW CTR. (Aug. 26, 2010), https://sites.law.lsu.edu/coast/2010/08/hurricane-ka
trina-was-flooding-really-a-surprise/ [https://perma.cc/3S5V-XUC8].
94. See FEMA REGION 10, THE 100 YEAR FLOOD MYTH 2 (2011), available at
https://training.fema.gov/hiedu/docs/hazrm/handout%203-5.pdf; Brian K. Sullivan,
Misleading 100-Year Flood Label Doesn’t Mean 99 Years of Safety, CLAIMS J., (Apr.
25, 2016), https://www.claimsjournal.com/news/national/2016/04/25/270325.htm
[https://perma.cc/CQ82-HM7S].
95. See Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance is Underwater Because of Out-
dated Science, SCI. AM. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/
national-flood-insurance-is-underwater-because-of-outdated-science/ [https://
perma.cc/PK28-5FMB] (discussing outdated scientific assumptions on which NFIP is
based).
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 29 15-FEB-19 10:24
2019] MANAGING HURRICANE RISK 419
and mitigation strategy, when the best estimate would average the dif-
ferent expert opinions in some manner.96
Hurricane Harvey illustrates all of these heuristics in action. Until
2017, the prevailing assumption had been that hurricanes move on a
linear path, dumping flood-producing rainfall along the way, with the
consequences being a function of the intensity of the storm and the
speed with which the system moves through a given area. What made
Harvey unique—and what government officials and the public had
not previously imagined—was a major hurricane stalling and slowly
meandering back and forth in a defined area over a ninety-six-hour
period. Yet although Harvey released over fifty inches of rain in some
areas, these rainfall totals were not unprecedented. Tropical Storm
Amelia in 1978, which prior to Harvey was the wettest tropical cy-
clone on record in the U.S., released forty-eight inches of rain in west-
central Texas. In 1979, Tropical Storm Claudette, which stalled for
twenty-four hours in eastern Texas and western Louisiana, set a
twenty-four-hour rainfall record at forty-two inches. Hurricane Easy
released forty-five inches of rain on parts of Florida in 1950.97 Al-
though those data were available, government officials underesti-
mated these risks and allowed development in areas with significant
flood risk without requiring adequate mitigation planning.98 Thus, al-
though experiences prior to 2017 with rainfall amounts in eastern
Texas arguably made Harvey’s consequences reasonably foreseeable,
private and public actors undervalued the flood risk, underap-
preciated the evolving changes in the nature of the risk, and reacted
slowly to the information available.99
96. See Harold Kunreuther, Mitigation and Insurance: Learning From Katrina, 604
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 208, 211 (2006).
97. Peter Sousounis, How Unique Was Hurricane Harvey’s Rainfall?, AIR (Aug.
31, 2017), http://www.air-worldwide.com/Blog/How-Unique-Was-Hurricane-Harvey
%E2%80%99s-Rainfall-/ [https://perma.cc/T4C9-MT5Z].
98. See Christopher Joyce, Scientists in Houston Tell a Story of Concrete, Rain and
Destruction, NPR (Nov. 9, 2017, 7:53 AM), https://www.npr.org/2017/11/09/563016223/
exploring-why-hurricane-harvey-caused-houstons-worst-fooding [https://perma.cc/
3SYQ-V659]; Vikas Bajaj et al., How Houston’s Growth Created the Perfect Flood
Conditions, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/09/
05/opinion/hurricane-harvey-flood-houston-development.html [https://perma.cc/
33QA-2LNB].
99. This is the core of the dispute in criminal charges brought by the Harris
County district attorney in August 2018 against a Houston chemical company that
allegedly consciously disregarded the known risk of flooding to the reckless endanger-
ment of surrounding populations. See Keri Blakinger et al., Arkema, CEO Indicted for
‘Reckless’ Chemical Release During Hurricane Harvey, HOUS. CHRON. (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Arkema-CEO
-indicted-for-reckless-chemical-13131012.php [https://perma.cc/8W8H-GHBS]. The
premise of the indictment is controversial. See Rebecca Hersher, Case Alleges Chemi-
cal Companies Should Prepare For Unprecedented Storms, NPR (Aug. 30, 2018, 5:46
PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/08/30/638936124/lawsuit-alleges-chemical-companies-
should-prepare-for-unprecedented-storms [https://perma.cc/6X3J-5MPT].
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 30 15-FEB-19 10:24
420 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 6
Beyond the factors that cause individuals, firms, and regulators to
underestimate risk and underinvest in prevention and mitigation, once
one experiences catastrophic loss, it is difficult to sustain attention on
addressing the risk and preparing for its next manifestation. Part of
this is a function of short election cycles that make it difficult for gov-
ernment to engage in sustained planning efforts and implement pro-
grams requiring attention over time. Professors Jones and
Baumgartner labeled this problem the inefficiency of attention-alloca-
tion—essentially a “bottleneck of agenda-setting” that “leads to se-
vere inefficiencies in the allocation of attention to problems.”100 With
natural disasters, government actors assume or hope that many years
will pass before the next catastrophe strikes, which conveniently ratio-
nalizes the actors’ choices to divert their attention to other imminent
issues. For example, at the time of Katrina, no hurricane had made
landfall in New Orleans for fifty years, and at the time of Harvey, no
major tropical rain event had occurred in Texas for thirty-nine years.
Although such storms are equally probable in any given year, many
people succumbed to the fallacy that a storm occurring in a given year
meant that previous intervals between similar storms are likely to re-
peat in the future.101
The U.S. experience with volcanic activity provides an illustration
of how these tendencies can play out in the insurance business. In May
1980, Mt. St. Helens erupted in the Cascade mountain range, destroy-
ing many homes and killing fifty-seven people, despite the fact that
the eruption occurred in a remote area of southern Washington.102 In
the most prominent insurance litigation following the eruption, in-
sureds sued two insurance companies that denied the insureds’ claims
for the loss of their homes under their homeowners policies because
the movement of Mt. St. Helens was an explosion excluded under
their policies’ terms.103 In a closely divided decision, the Washington
Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s entry of summary judgment
for the insurers and remanded the case for additional fact findings.104
Interestingly, prior to March 1980, the insurance form in question con-
tained a specific exclusion for loss “caused by . . . volcanic erup-
100. BRYAN D. JONES & FRANK R. BAUMGARTNER, THE POLITICS OF ATTENTION:
HOW GOVERNMENT PRIORITIZES PROBLEMS 277 (2005).
101. See generally Timothy Hall & Kelly Hereid, The Frequency and Duration of
U.S. Hurricane Droughts, 42 GEOPHYSICAL RES. LETTERS 3482 (2015) (analyzing, in
2014, the probability that a major hurricane would occur within the next year and end
the nine-year run with no major landfall in the U.S.); Floods: Recurrence Intervals and
100-Year Floods (USGS), USGS, https://water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood.html (last
updated Mar. 13, 2018) [https://perma.cc/KJ3P-JNDV].
102. See Mary Bagley, Mount St. Helens Eruption: Facts & Information, LIVES-
CIENCE (Oct. 16, 2018), https://www.livescience.com/27553-mount-st-helens-eruption.
html [https://perma.cc/8N6Y-KKJP].
103. Graham v. Public Employees Mut. Ins. Co., 656 P.2d 1077 (Wash. 1983) (en
banc).
104. Id. at 1081.
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tion.”105 In an effort to simplify the form and ostensibly improve its
readability, the insurers revised it to exclude “loss resulting directly or
indirectly from: . . . 2. Earth Movement. Direct loss by . . . explosion
. . . resulting from earth movement is covered.”106 Thus, the new form
applicable to the May 1980 eruption had no explicit reference to vol-
canic eruption. In many situations, clearly drafted policy language will
support a summary judgment in the insurer’s favor, but in this Wash-
ington case, the court concluded that the applicability of the new lan-
guage was a jury question.107
What is interesting about the Mt. St. Helens narrative is that insur-
ance companies routinely take great care in drafting their policies, but
the drafters of the policy at issue did not perceive volcanoes as a risk
that merited specific mention in the exclusions. At the time of the
policy redrafting, the last volcano to erupt in the lower forty-eight
states was Lassen Peak in northern California in 1915.108 A number of
small eruptions in active Alaska volcanoes, primarily located in re-
mote areas on Alaska’s peninsula, went almost unnoticed.109 Thus, by
1980, despite the existence of numerous volcanically active mountains
in the western U.S., the risk of volcanic eruption was essentially out of
mind, at least for insurance underwriting purposes.110 Further, since
1980, attention to the risk of volcanoes has not been persistent.111 For
example, more than 150,000 people currently live on what are ancient
mudflows of Mt. Rainier, and major highways, utilities, businesses,
dams, and seaports will be in the path of these mudflows when they
recur.112 Mt. Rainier last erupted in 1894–1895, and scientists project a
one-in-ten chance of a volcano producing a mudflow that would reach
105. Id. at 1079.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 1079–80.
108. See The Eruption of Lassen Peak, NAT’L PARK SERV. (Feb. 28, 2015), https://
www.nps.gov/lavo/learn/nature/eruption_lassen_peak.htm [https://perma.cc/AZ83-
BVQN]. The 1915 eruption was the most powerful of a series of eruptions from 1914
to 1917. Lassen Peak is the largest of a group of thirty volcanoes that have erupted in
that region over the last 300,000 years. Id.
109. See How Often Do Alaskan Volcanoes Erupt?, USGS at https://www.usgs.gov/
faqs/how-often-do-alaskan-volcanoes-erupt?qt-news_science_products=0#qt-news_sci
ence_products (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/SAK9-9XK7].
110. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, It’s Not Just Hawaii: The U.S. Has 169 Volcanoes That
Could Erupt, N.Y. TIMES (May 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/14/us/us-
active-volcanoes-hawaii.html [https://perma.cc/RX2G-SCGE] (“The United States
Geological Survey counts 169 potentially active volcanoes in the country . . . .”).
111. The recent eruption of Kilauea in Hawai’i Volcanoes National Park does not
appear to have sparked significant reflection on significant risks in the Cascade
Range. For more on the Hawai’i volcanoes, see Park Closure Information & FAQ,
Hawai’i Volcanoes National Park, NAT’L PARK SERV. https://web.archive.org/web/
20180712121325/https://www.nps.gov/havo/2018-closure.htm (last visited Dec. 10,
2018) [https://perma.cc/9AJN-3C98].
112. CAROLYN L. DRIEDGER & WILLIAM E. SCOTT, MOUNT RAINIER—LEARNING
TO LIVE WITH VOLCANIC RISK, USGS (2002), available at https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/
2002/0034/report.pdf.
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the Puget Sound lowland during an average human lifespan.113 In
short, despite ample evidence of the consequences of ignoring natural
disaster risk, individuals, firms, and regulators routinely underinvest in
preventing and limiting those consequences.
Notwithstanding the awesome forces that produce hurricanes, much
can be done to prevent loss and mitigate consequences. The most ob-
vious and effective way to reduce any kind of natural disaster risk is
not to live or operate a business in a geographic area prone to such
disasters. Today, population patterns are trending in the other direc-
tion. The infrequency of natural disasters, the unpredictability of
where impacts will occur, and the overall quality of living in areas at
greatest risk combine to attract residents and businesses to these ar-
eas. This is especially true with respect to coastal living where the hur-
ricane risk is acute. Cultural and social factors, employment, expense,
and inertia are compelling reasons why relocation is an unattractive
option for many individuals and businesses. Although it may be rea-
sonable to predict that the increasing risk of hurricane damage on and
near the coasts may reduce the rate of growth in—or at least the num-
ber of people or businesses choosing to reside in—these locations,
under any reasonable scenario the assets and people exposed in these
locations will remain massive.114 New Orleans is an example of this.
Despite the significant population declines in the city after Hurricane
Katrina, the city and its exposures remain large.115
Another option is simply to spend more on mitigation.116 Hurri-
canes predominantly produce two kinds of damage—wind and
flood.117 For each peril, many opportunities to deploy mitigation strat-
egies exist.118 Wind damage can be ameliorated through: structural
113. Carolyn L. Driedger & William E. Scott, Mount Rainier – Living Safely With a
Volcano in Your Backyard, GEOLOGY.COM, https://geology.com/usgs/rainier/ (last vis-
ited Dec. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/UZD5-CQS9].
114. Migration away from the coasts will eventually be necessary due to water in-
undation. See Mathew E. Hauer et al., Millions Projected to Be at Risk From Sea-
Level Rise in the Continental United States, 6 NATURE 691 (2016) (forecasting that
13.1 million Americans are at risk of needing to migrate to inland areas to escape
water inundation); Kendra Pierre-Louis, As Sea Levels Rise, Where Will All the Peo-
ple Go?, POPULAR SCI. (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.popsci.com/sea-level-rise-refugee
#page-3 [https://perma.cc/86SP-2NDE].
115. The population of New Orleans fell from 484,674 in April 2000 to an estimated
230,172 in July 2006 (after Katrina), halving the city’s population. By July 2015, the
population had increased to 386,617, approximately 20% lower than it was pre-Ka-
trina. Allison Plyer, Facts for Features: Katrina Impact, THE DATA CTR. (Aug. 26,
2016), https://www.datacenterresearch.org/data-resources/katrina/facts-for-impact/
[https://perma.cc/2GCN-7NKL].
116. Barnosky, supra note 55.
117. AGUADO & BURT, supra note 7, at 370–74.
118. Earthquakes are susceptible to analogous arrays of mitigation and prevention
strategies. See generally FEMA, HOMEBUILDERS’ GUIDE TO EARTHQUAKE RESIS-
TANT DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION (2006), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-
library-data/20130726-1535-20490-7368/fema232.pdf.
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bracing,119 straps and clips,120 anchor bolts,121 impact-resistant
glass,122 solid roofing surfaces on commercial buildings,123 reinforced
pedestrian and garage doors,124 hurricane shutters,125 interlocking
roof shingles and improved nailing patterns,126 special anchors for mo-
bile homes,127 foundation designs that resist lateral wind and water
forces,128 continuous steel bracing for chimneys,129 and tree prun-
ing.130 Construction and zoning codes that require these measures on
new construction or retrofitting upon remodeling are key components
of these risk management strategies.131
119. See James Glave, Hurricane Safety Lessons Learned From Past Storms, THIS
OLD HOUSE, https://www.thisoldhouse.com/ideas/hurricane-safety-lessons-learned-
past-storms (last visited Dec. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M7H5-WRW8].
120. See Ernest Beck, Tying Down the Roof, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2005), https://
www.nytimes.com/2005/09/01/garden/tying-down-the-roof.html?mtrref=www.google.
com [https://perma.cc/5AH4-WST7] (these small structural bracing devices are made
of galvanized steel and reinforce house joints, as well as anchor the roof to the house,
better than nails can).
121. See John W. van de Lindt et al., Performance of Wood-Frame Structures Dur-
ing Hurricane Katrina, 21 J. PERFORMANCE CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 108, 115 (rec-
ommending the use of proper anchor bolts with other straps and ties).
122. See, e.g., Impact-Resistant Hurricane Windows and Patio Doors, PELLA CORP.,
http://www.pella.com/features-options/hurricaneshield/ [https://perma.cc/TF7D-7E
HS] (advertising impact-resistant windows).
123. See JOSHUA KNEIFEL ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF RESTRICTING AGGREGATE-SURFACED ROOFING SYSTEMS IN TOR-
NADO-PRONE AREAS OF THE U.S. 1 (2016), available at https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/
nistpubs/TechnicalNotes/NIST.TN.1930.pdf.
124. See FEMA, PROTECTING YOUR PROPERTY FROM WIND, available at http://
www.crh.noaa.gov/Image/fwd/pdf/swa/FEMA_Protecting_Business_Wind.pdf (noting
that garage doors and double entry doors are especially susceptible to high winds and
may be a weak point).
125. See FEMA, PROTECT WINDOWS AND DOORS WITH COVERS (2017), available
at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1627-20490-8875/how2017_how
2029_protect_windows_doors_4_11.pdf.
126. See FEMA, MITIGATION IDEAS: A RESOURCE FOR REDUCING RISK TO NATU-
RAL Hazards 46 (2013), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/
20130726-1904-25045-2423/fema_mitigation_ideas_final_01252013.pdf.
127. See Joseph B. Treaster & Henry Fountain, Considered Vulnerable, Mobile
Homes Are Battered but Largely Intact, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2017), https://
www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/us/mobile-homes-florida-irma.html [https://perma.cc/
7C39-VJ88] (noting that stricter mobile home regulations reduced damage to mobile
homes during Hurricane Irma). These anchors may be required to obtain insurance.
Id.
128. See FEMA, RECOMMENDED RESIDENTIAL CONSTRUCTION FOR COASTAL AR-
EAS: BUILDING ON STRONG AND SAFE FOUNDATIONS 2-1–5-5 (2d ed. 2009).
129. See FEMA, supra note 126, at 46 (suggesting “new masonry chimneys greater
than 6 feet above a roof to have continuous reinforced steel bracing”).
130. See FEMA, REMOVE TREES AND POTENTIAL WINDBORNE MISSILES (2011),
available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1627-20490-3107/
how2020_trees_missiles_4_11.pdf.
131. Houston, Texas is sometimes mentioned as the only large city in the U.S. to
lack zoning regulations. See Bill Schadewald, The Only Major U.S. City Without Zon-
ing, HOUS. BUS. J. (Apr. 9, 2006), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/stories/2006/
04/10/editorial1.html [https://perma.cc/FZF9-HLVU]; Loren Steffy, Lack of Zoning
Has Paid off for Houston, HOUS. CHRON. (May 28, 2008), https://www.chron.com/
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With respect to flooding—many of these techniques are suitable
whether the risk is hurricane-related or river and surface-water re-
lated—loss can be prevented through: increased freeboard require-
ments, which set the number of feet above flood elevation at which
structures must be built,132 tie-downs for propane tanks,133 prohibi-
tions on first-floor enclosed space in flood-plain and coastal areas to
enable storm surge to flow through the first floor opening instead of
overwhelming the entire structure or destroying the first-floor living
space,134 ensuring that appliances and heating and cooling units are
above potential flood levels,135 detention basin designs, which are
lands set aside to collect water that would otherwise flood property,136
business/steffy/article/Lack-of-zoning-has-paid-off-for-Houston-1678292.php [https://
perma.cc/JK9N-W3QF]. Houston, however, has many regulations that function simi-
larly to zoning rules despite the absence of codification. Critics argue that these rules
are not part of a comprehensive plan or strategy, which is typical of most zoning
codes. See Ryan Holeywell, Forget What You’ve Heard, Houston Really Does Have
Zoning (Sort of), RICE KINDER, (Sept. 8, 2015), https://kinder.rice.edu/2015/09/08/for
get-what-youve-heard-houston-really-does-have-zoning-sort-of/ [https://perma.cc/
CUZ3-3ZGM]. Further, whether this regulatory framework (or vacuum, depending
on one’s point of view) increased the flood damage from Harvey is hotly contested.
See Aaron Davis et al., Houston’s ‘Wild West’ Growth: How the City’s Development
May Have Contributed to Devastating Flooding, WASH. POST (Aug. 29, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2017/investigations/harvey-urban-planning/?utm_
term=.ac8884df1776 [https://perma.cc/4F35-X2RZ]. Scott Beyer, Don’t Blame Hous-
ton’s Lack of Zoning for Harvey Flooding, THE HILL (Sept. 3, 2017), https://
thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/state-local-politics/349021-opinion-dont-blame-hous
tons-lack-of-zoning-laws-for [https://perma.cc/JV89-AXQD] (Jim Blackburn of Rice
University said that Houston’s flooding is not a zoning-related problem, referencing
clay composition of soil, which impedes water absorption, that no amount of zoning
could alleviate). Irvin Dawid, The Culprit of Houston Flooding: Sprawl, Not Lack of
Zoning, PLANETIZEN (Sept. 4, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.planetizen.com/node/
94613/culprit-houston-flooding-sprawl-not-lack-zoning [https://perma.cc/XG78-
N6LW] (quoting Professor John Jacob, Texas A&M scientist, regarding loss of water-
absorbing freshwater wetlands due to urban sprawl).
132. See Freeboard, FEMA, https://www.fema.gov/freeboard (last visited June 28,
2018) [https://perma.cc/58WF-GNPC].
133. See PROPANE SAFETY AND HURRICANES, PROPANE EDUC. & RES. COUNCIL,
available at https://www.propane.com/uploadedFiles/PropaneMain/Propane/Residen-
tial/Safety/Hurricane_Safety_Instructions/propane-safety-and-hurricanes.pdf [https://
perma.cc/MDG6-6XHJ] (noting to ensure that “[i]n flood zone areas, . . . large above-
ground and underground propane tanks are anchored securely to avoid potentially
dangerous situations”).
134. See David Ovalle, Keys Homes, Battered but Standing, May Be a Model for
Reducing Damage in Florida, MIAMI HERALD (Sept. 14, 2017), https://www.miamiher
ald.com/news/weather/hurricane/article173408496.html [https://perma.cc/Z5HP-
DU8Y] (“The ground-floor garage — designed to give way to surge — was an unmiti-
gated mess, along with the docks and yard. But the structure stood strong, the upper
floor where people live untouched inside.”).
135. See FEMA, HOMEOWNER’S GUIDE TO RETROFITTING: SIX WAYS TO PROTECT
YOUR HOME FROM FLOODING 9-1–9-7 (3d ed. 2014), available at https://www.
fema.gov/media-library-data/1404148604102-f210b5e43aba0fb393443fe7ae9cd953/FE
MA_P-312.pdf.
136. See Stormwater Detention: How It Works, HARRIS CTY. FLOOD CONTROL
DIST., https://www.hcfcd.org/flooding-floodplains/stormwater-detention-how-it-
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and water runoff management, which directs the path of excess
water.137 These techniques will not prevent wind-driven water or a
flood from occurring, but each may reduce the size of the losses when
they occur. Although Hurricane Michael destroyed most of Mexico
Beach, Florida in October 2018, relatively low-cost reinforcements
saved the few homes that withstood the storm.138
Numerous challenges exist to increasing prevention and mitigation.
Investments in construction, buildings, and infrastructure to minimize
loss in the event of a disaster are often low priority on account of the
previously-described heuristic.139 Despite data consistently demon-
strating strong returns on individual or firm investments in prevention
and mitigation, retrofitting is expensive, and installing loss-reducing
features in new construction can add significantly to construction
cost.140 Uncertainty is a factor; the extent to which such investments
will actually result in loss reduction is unknown until the hardened
construction and infrastructure actually confronts a disaster. This un-
certainty often deters the investment.141 Many individuals and firms
find it difficult, or are sometimes unable, to translate short-term costs
into long-term benefits. This uncertainty tends to result in under-
investment in loss mitigation and leads to the purchase of
insurance.142
Government actions and incentives can counter the tendency of pri-
vate actors to underinvest in loss mitigation. Government has built,
and owns, much of the nation’s infrastructure, and thus public officials
works/ (last visited June 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/C6CV-85CA] (describing the pro-
cess of using excavated water storage areas “to offset or mitigate the negative effect
development may have on flooding (due to covering up soil with buildings and con-
crete and speeding up the rate water runs off an area)”).
137. See Ian Bogost, Houston’s Flood Is a Design Problem, ATLANTIC (Aug. 28,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/08/why-cities-flood/
538251/ [https://perma.cc/YJ46-J3KC] (explaining that impervious surfaces are to
blame for flooding issues within cities and that stormwater management is the solu-
tion to remove that rainfall from the city, though the process may not be ideal).
138. See Patricia Sullivan et al., Houses Intact After Hurricane Michael Were Often
Saved by Low-Cost Reinforcements, WASH. POST (Oct. 17, 2018), https://www.wash
ingtonpost.com/politics/panhandle-houses-intact-after-michael-were-often-saved-by-
low-cost-reinforcements/2018/10/17/d3ca97c0-d152-11e8-b2d2-f397227b43f0_story.
html?utm_term=.adfda46015d9 [https://perma.cc/DT47-J29G].
139. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
140. By one calculation, the cost to retrofit a home for hurricane preparedness is
approximately $30,000. See Dan Bigman, What Would It Cost to Make Your House
Truly Storm Proof? A Start Shopping List., FORBES (Oct. 29, 2012, 4:26 PM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/danbigman/2012/10/29/what-would-it-cost-to-make-your-house-
truly-storm-proof-a-starter-shopping-list/#6d48e98360a7 [https://perma.cc/2ETF-DF
YH]. For detailed analysis of costs and benefits of particular mitigation strategies, see
NAT’L INST. OF BUILDING SCI., NATURAL HAZARD MITIGATION SAVES: 2017 IN-
TERIM REPORT (2017), available at http://www.wbdg.org/files/pdfs/MS2_2017Interim
%20Report.pdf.
141. Id. at 10.
142. See Eric Neumayer et al., The Political Economy of Natural Disaster Damage,
24 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 8, 9 (2014).
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have the authority to specify the extent the government invests—at
taxpayer expense—in hardening these assets. As for privately owned
assets, government can influence or control these through zoning reg-
ulations and building codes, rules affecting where private actors can
locate their residences and businesses, and rules that specify the ex-
tent to which government requires loss-mitigation investments in new
construction or retrofits.143 The federal government can encourage
private investment through tax incentives, can provide direct funding
for an array of investments—either fully or on a cost-sharing basis—
and can create other incentives to encourage states and localities to
adopt additional pre-loss mitigation strategies.144 Yet just as the pri-
vate sector is likely to underinvest in prevention and mitigation, gov-
ernment has a tendency to do so as well. Government efforts to
require private investments are typically unpopular, and investing
public revenues on behalf of private actors is likely to be unpopular
with taxpayers. Public officials tend to prefer short-term political sup-
port over the negative consequences attached to unpopular decisions
that produce under-appreciated, long-term benefits.145
To summarize, although many options exist for making cost-effec-
tive, benefit-optimizing investments in prevention and mitigation, the
impediments to pursuing them appear, thus far, nearly impossible to
overcome. Thus, in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season, tax-
payers paid more in disaster relief than the combined sum of wind-
related losses under private insurance and flood-insured losses under
the National Flood Insurance Program.146 Yet the federal govern-
ment’s pre-disaster mitigation spending decreased from $157 million
in 2005 to $19 million in 2014, despite evidence that such expenditures
reduce post-loss costs by many multiples of the amount of the
investment.147
143. Id.
144. Barnosky, supra note 55.
145. Id.
146. ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN & JACQUELINE VOLKMAN-WISE, THE RISK OF
EVER-GROWING DISASTER RELIEF EXPECTATIONS 3 (2011), available at http://cite
seerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.420.5131&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
147. It Pays to Prepare for Natural Disasters, PEW (May 8, 2017), http://www.pew
trusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/fact-sheets/2017/05/it-pays-to-prepare-for-natural-
disasters [https://perma.cc/NV3Y-YL7K]. One recent study produced an estimate that
the net present value of $1 of disaster preparedness correlates with $15 in reduction of
future damage, discounted to present value. See Andrew Healy & Neil Malhortra,
Myopic Voters and Natural Disaster Policy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 387, 396 (2009).
See also Cheney M. Shreve & Ian Kelman, Does Mitigation Save? Reviewing Cost-
Benefit Analyses of Disaster Risk Reduction, 10 INT’L J. DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
213 (2014) (reviewing literature that mitigation saves lives, the environment, and
money in the U.S. and globally).
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B. Limitations of Private Insurance
Insurance literature often refers to natural disasters as uninsurable
risks,148 but the description uninsurable is somewhat misleading be-
cause insurance for many kinds of natural disasters is, in fact, availa-
ble. Describing the insurability of hurricane and other natural disaster
risk as difficult is unquestionably correct.149 The primary characteris-
tics of difficult risks are twofold.150 First, they resist diversification.
When a risk pool consists of perfectly or highly correlated risks—
meaning that a very large percentage of the risk pool is certainly or
likely to suffer loss when a covered peril happens—loss-spreading dis-
tribution of risk is ineffective, and the insurance mechanism will fail.
Second, difficult risks are ambiguous in that both their frequency and
their consequences are difficult to predict. When measuring the risk is
complex and prone to inaccuracy, insurers tend not to supply the
product or are willing to do so only if the premiums are high enough
to cover the insurer’s uncertainty risk. Thus, difficult risks can lead to
an absence of supply and consequent market failure.
The market for flood insurance is a classic example of a difficult risk
causing market failure. Early property insurance and accidental loss
policies covered flood damage, but the industry’s interest in selling the
product ceased in the wake of serious flood loss events in the early
20th century.151 Multiple reasons led to insurers exiting this market.
Insurers lacked reliable flood data, which prevented accurate product
pricing, which in turn led to product scarcity and high premiums
where coverage existed.152 Insurers did not discover an effective way
to deal with severe adverse selection; those who needed the coverage
were most likely to purchase it, which led to higher premiums that
dampened demand and increased the amount of uninsured risk.153
The highly correlated nature of flood risk, the inability of insurers to
adequately diversify the risk, and the unevenness of the frequency of
flood events over periods of time essentially overwhelmed the ability
148. See, e.g., National Flood Insurance Program, NAT’L ASS’N FOR INS. COMMIS-
SIONERS, https://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_nfip.htm (last updated Sept. 25, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/5RN5-MP2W]; Dwight M. Jaffee & Thomas Russell, Catastrophe In-
surance, Capital Markets, and Uninsurable Risks, 64 J. RISK & INS. 205, 206 (1997)
(catastrophes are considered an “uninsurable risk”).
149. See Lucien J. Dhooge, A Previously Unimaginable Risk Potential: September
11 and the Insurance Industry, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 687, 774 (2003).
150. See Robert H. Jerry, II & Steven E. Roberts, Regulating the Business of Insur-
ance: Federalism in an Age of Difficult Risk, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 835, 842–46
(2006). A third characteristic is that demand for insurance for difficult risks is low due
to the heuristics discussed elsewhere in this article. Id. at 845–46. See Kunreuther,
supra note 86.
151. See Adam F. Scales, A Nation of Policyholders: Governmental and Market
Failure in Flood Insurance, 26 MISS. C.L. REV. 3, 6 (2007) (discussing the early history
of flood insurance).
152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 8–9.
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of insurers to cover the risk.154 When Hurricane Betsy highlighted
that most homes in the Gulf region were at risk for catastrophic flood-
ing damage in hurricanes but did not have flood insurance,155 the ab-
sence of a functional private market and an evolving sense of the
proper governmental role in disaster responsibility led to the enact-
ment of the National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) in 1968.156
Although Congress expected the NFIP to restore the private flood
insurance market, this intervention failed, and subsequent attempts to
improve that outcome have not succeeded.157 Three problems with
the current framework are particularly salient. First, persistent confu-
sion exists among consumers about what policies need to be pur-
chased. In the face of this confusion, many consumers fail to purchase
any coverage at all.158 For example, many policyholders incorrectly
assume that coverage for windstorm, which is included in most—but
not all—homeowners policies, brings hurricane losses within the cov-
erage. But the standard policy covers wind loss and excludes flood
loss. In the context of hurricanes, wind and water can act either inde-
pendently or concurrently to cause loss. Thus, insurers treat losses
caused by storm surge flooding as excluded flood loss, while losses
caused by wind-driven rain intrusion (for example, through broken
windows or a wind-damaged roof) are covered.159 Many property in-
surance policies contain anti-concurrent cause provisions, which pro-
vide that if a loss is caused by a combination of a covered cause (e.g.,
wind) and an excluded cause (e.g., flood), the loss is not covered.160 If
these provisions are enforced,161 they narrow coverage. Moreover,
154. See Patricia Born & W. Kip Viscusi, The Catastrophic Effects of Natural Disas-
ters on Insurance Markets, 33 J. RISK UNCERTAINTY 55 (2006).
155. See Logan Strother, The National Flood Insurance Program: A Case Study in
Policy Failure, Reform, and Retrenchment, 46 POLICY STUDIES J. 1, 8 (2016) (discuss-
ing the history of NFIP). Hurricane Betsy killed seventy-six and caused more than $10
billion in damage (in current dollars). See Mike Scott, Remembering Hurricane Betsy,
a New Orleans Nightmare, TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.nola.com/
300/2017/05/hurricane_betsy_new_orleans_05312017.html [https://perma.cc/X93B-
DEMB].
156. See Strother, supra note 155, at 8–9.
157. Id. at 8–10.
158. See Press Release, Insurance Information Institute, Hurricane Harvey Cover-
age: Key Differences Between Homeowners Insurance and Flood Insurance (Aug. 30,
2017), https://www.iii.org/press-release/hurricane-harvey-insurance-coverage-key-dif
ferences-between-homeowners-insurance-and-flood-insurance-090617 [https://perma.
cc/D4GJ-CP2V] (reporting that over 40% of homeowners think that standard home-
owner’s insurance covers flood damage caused by heavy rain).
159. Jennifer Walker, Storm Event: When Multiple Water Perils Intersect, AMWINS
GRP., INC. (Apr. 24, 2016), http://www.amwins.com/insights/article/storm-event-when-
multiple-water-perils-intersect_4-18 [https://perma.cc/5XAW-ED2F].
160. See Dale Gilsinger, Validity, Construction, and Application of Anticoncurrent
Causation (ACC) Clauses in Insurance Policies, 37 A.L.R.6th 657 (2008).
161. Some courts have held that these clauses violate public policy and are unen-
forceable. See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Hirschmann, 773 P.2d 413 (Wash. 1989);
Murray v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. 509 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1998), Other courts have
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property insurance policies sold in coastal areas often exclude cover-
age for wind damage. In Texas, for example, after Hurricane Celia in
1970, many insurers decided to cease selling homeowners insurance in
the coastal communities. The legislature responded in 1971 by creat-
ing the Texas Windstorm Insurance Association that offers, via a con-
sortium consisting of every property insurer in the state, specially
rated windstorm coverage in fourteen coastal counties and part of
Harris County—but not Houston.162 In other words, whether cover-
age exists for hurricane-caused wind damage in a homeowners policy
varies with the product and the locale in which it is sold, which adds
further confusion to the market.
Second, when coverage exists, policy limits and deductibles often
fall short of what is needed to repair or replace damaged property
without substantial out-of-pocket policyholder contribution. Although
replacement cost coverage has been the norm for decades, if a policy-
holder fails to insure property for at least 80% of the replacement
cost, a loss will be adjusted at actual cash value, which means depreci-
ation is offset from replacement cost when calculating the proceeds to
be paid.163 The older the property, the larger the offset and resulting
coverage gap will be. This gap, which is called a coinsurance penalty,
tends to arise in times of appreciating construction costs when in-
sureds do not periodically review the relation between their policy
limits and asset values. Additionally, in nineteen states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia, insurers are authorized to use percentage deduct-
ibles for hurricane losses, as opposed to the usual first-dollar
deductible applicable to other losses.164 The hurricane deductible, like
any deductible, has the effect of taking small losses—up to the amount
of the deductible—outside the coverage. The insured selects the size
of the deductible from a menu of options, with larger deductibles pro-
ducing lower premiums. The hurricane deductible, however, is typi-
cally larger, usually varying between 1% and 5% of the replacement
cost of the property, which increases out-of-pocket expenses for the
policyholder. Moreover, in the aftermath of catastrophes, insurers
have historically responded by limiting their exposure in catastrophe-
prone areas through stricter underwriting, higher deductibles, and
lower coverage limits.165
upheld them. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bongen, 925 P.2d 1042 (Alaska
1996); Bao v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 535 F.Supp.2d 532 (D. Md. 2008).
162. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-7, NATURAL DISASTERS:
PUBLIC POLICY OPTIONS FOR CHANGING THE FEDERAL ROLE IN NATURAL CATAS-
TROPHE INSURANCE 67–69 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-08-7].
163. JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 66, at 549–53.
164. See Background on: Hurricane and Windstorm Deductibles, INS. INFO. INST.,
https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-hurricane-and-windstorm-deductibles (last
visited June 25, 2018) [https://perma.cc/G6DG-CP4U].
165. See Robert Meyers, Impact of Natural Catastrophes on Insurance Market, INS.
J. (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/mag-features/2017/
11/20/471204.htm [https://perma.cc/EM4V-YXKQ] (in the aftermath of 2017 hurri-
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Third, when coverage is available, homeowners and renters fre-
quently fail to purchase it. Some simply lack an understanding of the
importance of insurance and do not comprehend the potential conse-
quences of not having it; consequently, they do not purchase it.166
Some households cannot afford it.167 Some own their homes without
an encumbrance from a lender or mortgagee; without a requirement
from a lender that they purchase insurance, they choose not to do
so.168 People who inherit unencumbered property sometimes fail to
consider the insurance implications of the inheritance. Some people,
aware of Congress’s proclivity to appropriate funds for disaster relief
and recovery, incorrectly assume that these ex post funds provide ade-
quate protection from the financial consequences of hurricanes and
therefore do not purchase insurance.
These limitations translate, even with significant federal interven-
tion in the flood insurance market, to significant coverage gaps.
According to the General Accountability Office (“GAO”), approxi-
mately 41% of homes that sustained severe damage from the 2005
hurricanes were uninsured or underinsured, and almost 38% of
owner-occupied homes that sustained severe wind damage lacked in-
surance against wind loss.169 In the northeast, where Hurricane Sandy
struck, only 15–25% of at-risk properties were insured for flood
loss.170 The same was true for the 2017 hurricanes: In Hurricane Har-
vey, fewer than 20% of victims had flood insurance.171 In Hurricane
Maria, roughly 50% of the homes and structures in Puerto Rico were
uninsured against wind damage.172 According to a McKinsey study, in
canes, “there will likely be an immediate increase in rates followed by higher deduct-
ibles and limitations on coverage in the longer term”); TOWERS WATSON,
HURRICANE KATRINA: ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT ON THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY
(2005), available at https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/impact-of-hurricane-katrina-on-
the-insurance-industry-towers-watson.pdf (describing the impact of Hurricane Ka-
trina on insurance rates and availability).
166. See HOWARD C. KUNREUTHER ET AL., INSURANCE AND BEHAVIORAL ECO-
NOMICS (2013).
167. Id.
168. In the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-234, 87 Stat. 975
(1973), Congress required federally regulated mortgage lenders to ensure that bor-
rowers in areas designated as flood risks purchase flood insurance and keep it in force
for the duration of the loan. Id. § 4012a.
169. See GAO-08-7, supra note 162, at 25.
170. Anita Lee, Sandy Catches Northeasterners Without Flood Coverage, SUN HER-
ALD (Nov. 2, 2012, 5:55 PM), https://weather.com/news/news/sandy-northeasterners-
no-insurance-201211 [https://perma.cc/ZX77-VEP4].
171. See Long, supra note 19.
172. Leslie Scism & Nicole Friedman, Hurricane Maria Exposes a Common Prob-
lem for Puerto Rico Homeowners: No Insurance, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:51
PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hurricane-maria-exposes-a-common-problem-for-
puerto-rico-homeowners-no-insurance-1505940660 [https://perma.cc/UAW5-TSZ5].
The insurance gap is a global problem. See Thomas Holzheu & Ginger Turner, Clos-
ing the Natural Catastrophe Protection Gap, SWISS RE INST. (Mar. 16, 2018), https://
www.swissre.com/institute/research/topics-and-risk-dialogues/natcat-and-climate/Clos
ing-the-natural-catastrophe-protection-gap.html [https://perma.cc/SD8M-AEVC].
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the counties most affected by Harvey, Maria, and Irma, approximately
80% of Texas homeowners, 60% of Florida homeowners, and 99% of
Puerto Rican homeowners did not have flood insurance.173
The failure of the private flood insurance market led to the NFIP
and the significant federal presence in that market, but the insurance
business may have matured in ways that now make it possible for the
private market to generate a viable flood insurance product. In fact, in
recent years, some insurance companies have entered the flood insur-
ance market, and others have expressed interest in doing so.174 Cur-
rently, the private residential flood insurance market is small—
probably 3.5–4.5% of all primary residential flood policies presently in
force175—and approximately 40% of these policies have been written
in Puerto Rico and Florida.176 Most private flood policies apply to
commercial properties, but the residential market is a significant por-
tion of all private flood insurance policies in force.177
Whether expanding private coverage is good for consumers is con-
troversial. The main critique is that private insurers will write cover-
age on lower-risk properties that the NFIP has overpriced, thereby
leaving the NFIP with higher-risk properties. This will drive the cost
of NFIP-underwritten insurance higher and create access problems for
those unable to afford the higher premiums.178 On the other hand,
private market advocates contend that any portion of the NFIP pro-
gram’s portfolio that can be handled in the private sector would pro-
duce a net positive by lowering taxpayer exposure for the current
deficits in the NFIP program.179 Also, to the extent that the private
market expands, better products with superior coverage more pre-
cisely tailored to the needs of particular categories will emerge. Skep-
173. ERWANN MICHEL-KERJAN & GIAMBATTISTA TAGLIONI, MCKINSEY & CO.,
INSURANCE HURRICANES: PERSPECTIVES, GAPS, AND OPPORTUNITIES AFTER 2017 9
(2017), available at https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/Industries/Financial
%20Services/Our%20Insights/Insuring%20hurricanes%20Perspectives%20gaps%20
and%20opportunities%20after%202017/Insuring-hurricanes-Perspectives-gaps-and-
opportunities-after-2017.ashx.
174. A careful review and informative discussion of the private residential flood
insurance market is contained in CAROLYN KOUSKY ET AL., WHARTON RISK MGMT.
& DECISION PROCESSES CTR., THE EMERGING PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL FLOOD INSUR-
ANCE MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES (2018).
175. Id. at 2. S&P Global Market Intelligence data indicate that the private market
grew 50% in 2017 over the prior year, with private policies now representing almost
15% of all national flood premiums. Ray Lehman, Private Flood Insurance Market Is
Getting Bigger, More Competitive, Less Profitable, INS. J., (Mar. 8, 2018), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/blogs/right-street/2018/03/18/483689.htm [https://perma.cc/
7JGQ-4DXC].
176. KOUSKY ET AL., supra note 174, at 2.
177. Id. at 4.
178. Id.; see also Daniel Schwarcz, How to Fix America’s Broken Flood Insurance
Scheme, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-
to-fix-americas-broken-flood-insurance-scheme/2017/09/07/7cb5d2fe-93d9-11e7-aace-
04b862b2b3f3_story.html?utm_term=.97971cc017e8 [https://perma.cc/RFG8-7TGN].
179. KOUSKY ET AL., supra note 174, at 4.
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tics, however, predict that insurers will be more likely to offer thinner
coverage that generates less ex post compensation, and to cancel poli-
cies or increase rates after policyholders file a claim.180 Skeptics also
express concern that a more robust private market, as it deflates NFIP
program revenues, will undermine NFIP flood mapping and mitiga-
tion programs.181 Even ardent advocates of a more robust private
flood insurance market concede that the private market will be unable
to underwrite most flood risk in the U.S. due to concentrated expo-
sures and correlated losses.182 Thus, the prospect of private market
expansion is essentially a question of whether public and private ca-
tastrophe insurance can co-exist, and whether an expanded private
presence will add stability to the overall market.
A different approach to reforming the private market borrows from
the regulatory tool—long a major feature of health insurance—of re-
quiring certain coverages for products sold in the private market. For
natural disaster risk, the government could mandate that all home-
owners insurance policies provide (and consumers pay for) cover-
age—i.e., that homeowners insurance becomes essentially an all-perils
policy.183 Significant public resistance to insurance mandates in the
health insurance sector suggests that such a major reform of home-
owners insurance would encounter substantial political resistance.184
A difference exists between mandating coverage terms and mandating
that consumers purchase policies, the latter of which has been a major
flash point in the ongoing debate over the Affordable Care Act. But
because the purchase of homeowners insurance is required by lenders
on mortgaged property, and because for most consumers self-insuring
personal residences is not an option, mandated coverage of natural
disaster risk in homeowners policies would increase premium levels,
likely resulting in pushback from the consuming public.185 In addition,
premium increases complicate access to the market for those with less
ability to pay, raising the question of whether low-income individuals
should receive government subsidies for purchasing coverage, and if
so, how the means testing would occur.186 In short, it is difficult to
180. Id.; see also id. at 20–21 (discussing that the NFIP has social goals and objec-
tives that insurers in the private market do not share).
181. Id. at 40–41.
182. Id. at 41.
183. For a discussion of the pros and cons of the all-peril policy alternative, see
GAO-08-7, supra note 162, at 36–41.
184. The controversial enactment of mandates in the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), now repealed on a party-
line vote in the December 2017 federal tax reform bill, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat.
2054 (2017), shows the likely outcome of any serious effort to mandate flood insur-
ance coverage in homeowners policies.
185. One concern is that where natural catastrophe risk is high, state regulators,
many of whom are elected, would refuse to give private insurers authority to charge
rates sufficient to cover the risk. See GAO-08-7, supra note 162, at 13.
186. Id. at 7, 33.
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imagine a political consensus supporting this kind of major restructur-
ing of the homeowners insurance market with respect to natural disas-
ter risk.
C. Ineffective Government Intervention to Support Private
Insurance Markets
Government-provided or government-subsidized insurance exists in
a variety of areas where the private market is unable to supply insur-
ance products deemed important to the public interest or is unable to
do so at an affordable cost. This is most obvious in health care access,
where insurance is the ticket to access to the health care system. Fail-
ures in the private insurance market were acknowledged over a half a
century ago, and significant government involvement in health insur-
ance markets resulted.187 Significant government intervention also oc-
curred in the market for crop insurance,188 deposit insurance in the
financial services industry, liability insurance for nuclear power gener-
ation, political risk insurance for some international business exports,
crime insurance for certain properties in designated urban areas, ter-
rorism insurance, and, of course, flood insurance.189
The details of the government role vary in each of these settings,
but the common purpose of public intervention is to moderate premi-
ums and maintain supply of the product. To accomplish these goals,
the government must commit to make appropriations necessary to
187. Medicare and Medicaid, the two largest federal health insurance programs,
together account for roughly 40% of all health care expenditures; the two programs’
expenditures combined are more than all private health insurance expenditures.
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2016
HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2016), available at https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-
Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/Downloads/high
lights.pdf.
188. A discussion of crop insurance is beyond the scope of this article, but crop
insurance is an important part of the nation’s flood preparedness strategy. For more
discussion on this, see JERRY, supra note 76.
189. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 66, at 54. These examples are all federally
based, but some state catastrophe programs exist as well, albeit in smaller scope. See,
e.g., History of the California Earthquake Authority (CEA): It All Started With an
Earthquake, CAL. EARTHQUAKE AUTH., https://www.earthquakeauthority.com/
About-CEA/CEA-History (last visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/LV35-RZE5]
(California created an earthquake fund in 1996 when private insurers significant
stepped out); About Us: Who We Are, CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citi
zensfla.com/who-we-are (last visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4PD8-EMJG]
(Florida established Citizens Property Insurance Corporation in 2002 to provide
state-backed insurance, but if a storm depletes its surplus, assessments on policyhold-
ers pay it back). Programs in Florida, Louisiana, Texas, and other states are funded
through a combination of premium payments, post-event assessments, and bonds. In
some of these programs, a deficit in the reserve is addressed through assessments on
all, or some subset, of policies sold in the state for a period of years into the future.
AMERICAN INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, WHAT ARE “RESIDUAL MARKETS” FOR PROP-
ERTY INSURANCE? 1–2, available at http://www.aiadc.org/File%20Library/Resources/
Industry%20Resources/PROPERTY—-National——Residual-Market-Descriptions-
White-Paper-295953.pdf.
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fund compensation payments that exceed the program’s reserves. An
understandable desire to keep premiums low causes many of these
programs to be under-reserved, which leads to these programs some-
times being unable to cover losses in a given year. The usual response
is for Congress to appropriate additional funds to sustain the program
and help it meet its obligations, which means losses are covered by
general revenues and are spread across all taxpayers. In other settings,
government assesses insurance companies for the deficits. This, in
turn, causes insurers to seek approval—sometimes under threat of
leaving the market entirely—to charge higher premiums across their
entire product line, which spreads the loss across all policyholders. If
insurers leave the market, this can create additional access issues and
stress.190
A governmental presence in an insurance market does not mean
that market forces vanish. When the government sells insurance in a
market and keeps premiums low, insureds are attracted to the prod-
uct, which will tend to crowd out products that private insurers might
otherwise attempt to sell. This increases the percentage of the market
covered by government insurance, which increases taxpayers’ finan-
cial exposure. Moreover, when premiums are kept artificially low rela-
tive to the actual risk, policyholders do not receive signals about the
cost of coverage or the costs of choices that increase risk (e.g., living in
disaster-prone areas). In turn, policyholders will make choices that in-
crease their exposures to risks, which increases losses.
The important government insurance program for hurricane risk is
the NFIP because storm surge and inland flooding are the most dan-
gerous and costly aspects of hurricanes.191 The NFIP has two primary
purposes: first, to offer insurance to properties with significant flood
190. This is part of the narrative of the aftermath of the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes in
Florida, where many large insurers left the market and some of the smaller ones be-
came insolvent. See Nancy Dahlberg, Will Your Homeowner Insurance Protect You If
the Big One Hits?, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 21, 2016, 4:00 PM), https://www.miamiher-
ald.com/news/business/biz-monday/article96929132.html [https://perma.cc/V6WC-
DQNV]. The lack of private market supply led to the formation of Citizens Insurance
Company, a state-run property insurance company, which at one point was the largest
insurance company in Florida. Leslie Scism, Why Florida Is Insured by Companies
You’ve Never Heard of, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-
florida-is-largely-insured-by-companies-youve-never-heard-of-1504782003 [https://
perma.cc/7DTN-R2Z6]. In recent years, the state has tried to “depopulate” the num-
ber of policyholders holding Citizens policies. Id. See also Programs: Depopulation,
CITIZENS PROP. INS. CORP., https://www.citizensfla.com/depopulation (last visited
Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5VLF-FPYJ]. Today, the Florida market, in contrast
to the era pre-2004/2005, consists of many smaller insurers who rely on reinsurance to
handle large losses. See Leslie Scism, Hurricane Michael to Test Florida’s Unique In-
surance Market, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 11, 2018, 5:30 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
hurricane-michael-to-test-floridas-unique-insurance-market-1539250200 [https://
perma.cc/MK23-GU7M].
191. DIANE P. HORN, CONG. RES. SERV., R45099, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE
PROGRAM: SELECTED ISSUES AND LEGISLATION IN THE 115TH CONGRESS 1 (2018).
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risk; and, second, to reduce flood risk by implementing floodplain
management standards.192 A long-term objective is to reduce federal
expenditure on post-flood disaster assistance.193 When Congress first
enacted the NFIP, the program’s structure involved federal underwrit-
ing of coverage sold through private insurers.194 The number of poli-
cies sold, however, was unexpectedly low. In response, Congress
revised the program so that the NFIP sold policies directly to the pub-
lic.195 The take-up rates—which refers to the percentage of property
owners in flood zones who purchase flood insurance—did not im-
prove significantly. Thus, in 1983, Congress replaced direct govern-
ment sales with a structure that continues today: a network of
approved private insurance companies market the insurance, NFIP
underwrites it,196 and a limited alternative track exists for acquiring
insurance through the NFIP’s direct servicing agent (“DSA”)—a pri-
vate contractor that represents FEMA in the sale, service, and claim
adjustment on policies sold through this alternative track.197 The
NFIP is more, however, than a publicly-funded insurance program;
the program’s other features involve identifying and mapping flood
risk, encouraging floodplain risk reduction, communicating flood risk
information to the public, and many other non-insurance activities.198
The evolution of the NFIP and how it functions are beyond the
scope of this discussion, but the consistent theme is that the penetra-
tion of flood insurance in flood-prone areas, especially those con-
fronting hurricane risk, is remarkably low.199 For those in flood plains
and coastal areas, the exact take-up rate is unknown, but available
data suggests it is about 50% overall.200 Outside designated flood
zones, the take-up rate for residential properties is closer to 20%, a
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 22, 32.
195. Id.
196. Professor Scales summarizes the program as follows: “This arrangement is
known as the Write-Your-Own (“WYO”) program, though that title is misleading.
The insurance contract is written by the NFIP and published in the Federal Register.
No deviations are permitted, and it is not governed by the law of insurance contracts
generally. Insurance companies retain 30% of premiums as a commission and receive
compensation for additional loss-adjustment expenses. These insurers are responsible
for enrolling policyholders, collecting premiums, and administering claims. In a num-
ber of respects—not all intended by Congress—they resemble the administrators of
ERISA plans: private insurers who wear one hat while fulfilling their own policy obli-
gations and wear another when they function as agents of the ERISA fiduciary. Simi-
larly, WYO insurers have been described as “fiscal agents” of the federal government,
a denomination that permeates their legal relationship to policyholders.” See Scales,
supra note 151, at 14–17.
197. Carolyn Kousky, Financing Flood Losses: A Discussion of the National Flood
Insurance Program, 21 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 11, 15 (2018).
198. Id. at 12; HORN, supra note 191, at 25.
199. For a discussion of current issues affecting the NFIP and a summary of re-
search on the economics of the program, see Kousky, supra note 197, at 2.
200. Id.
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figure that closely tracks the number of flooded properties with flood
insurance coverage after Hurricane Harvey and Superstorm Sandy.201
Moreover, NFIP policies are distributed unevenly around the country;
five states (Florida, Texas, Louisiana, California, and New Jersey) ac-
count for two-thirds of all U.S. policies, and two of these states (Flor-
ida, 37%; and Texas, 11%) account for almost half of all the
policies.202 Because of low take-up rates and increasing disaster
payouts, the program is deeply in debt, despite the fact that coverage
under the program is thinner than many realize.203 For example, resi-
dential property coverage is capped at $250,000, does not cover living
costs if displaced from a damaged property, and does not provide cov-
erage for personal belongings.204
Developing a more stable flood insurance program has proved elu-
sive. To encourage greater participation in the program, premiums
need to be kept low; but maintaining lower premiums is at odds with
maintaining the fiscal soundness of the program. Conversely, when
flood insurance premiums are priced at actuarially accurate levels to
promote fiscal soundness, the policies are too expensive for many. The
NFIP provides subsidies to policyholders to assist them with paying
their premiums, which is generally a noncontroversial way for the gov-
ernment to support insurance markets, but the introduction of subsi-
dies complicates efforts to maintain fiscal soundness.205
The program is also hampered by anomalies that defeat actuarial
soundness and exacerbate fiscal imbalance. Chief among these anom-
alies is that the program encourages reconstruction of damaged homes
and businesses in areas subject to recurrent flooding. According to
The Pew Charitable Trusts, structures rebuilt multiple times after
flooding constitute only 1% of NFIP policies, but they account for
25–30% of claims.206 Compelling evidence exists that shows that risks
201. See supra notes 160–61.
202. Kousky, supra note 197, at 20.
203. Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood Insurance Program, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/04/business/a-broke-and-bro
ken-flood-insurance-program.html [https://perma.cc/MGB9-3JLR]. The program has
been in debt since Hurricane Katrina. Id.
204. See FEMA, NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: SUMMARY OF COVER-
AGE 1–3 (2012), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1620-
20490-4648/f_679_summaryofcoverage_11_2012.pdf. These limitations are often cited
as reasons to encourage private insurers to enter the flood insurance market.
205. CAROLYN KOUSKY & LEONARD SHABMAN, PRICING FLOOD INSURANCE:
HOW AND WHY THE NFIP DIFFERS FROM A PRIVATE INSURANCE COMPANY 1 (2014),
available at http://www.rff.org/files/sharepoint/WorkImages/Download/RFF-DP-14-
37.pdf.
206. Repeatedly Flooded Properties Cost Billions, PEW (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.
pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/data-visualizations/2016/repeatedly-flooded-
properties-cost-billions [https://perma.cc/ZQ27-UBUA]. These so-called “repetitive
loss properties” cost approximately half of the NFIP’s debt as it stood in 2016. Ap-
proximately 10% of these properties have received payments in excess of their values,
and the number of such properties is increasing at the rate of about 5,000 a year. Id.
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and premiums are mismatched in the program.207 After Hurricane Ka-
trina caused NFIP deficits to soar, analysis of policies in force re-
vealed that roughly 20% of NFIP policyholders had been paying rates
below what NFIP defines as a full-risk premium.208 But a recent study
of North Carolina properties found that NFIP premiums are “signifi-
cantly higher than risk-based premiums for more than 90[%] of the
homes in each of the counties and more than 87.4[%] of the samples
in each of the four analyses [in the study].”209 Flood-zone maps are
out of date and inaccurate in many locations, which causes premium
and risk mismatches.210 Further, because the program sets premiums
based on average historical losses within a flood zone rather than each
individual property’s flood risk, high-value homes are underpriced rel-
ative to low-value homes. Because property values correlate with
owners’ wealth, this mismatch results in an anomalous cross-subsidy
of wealthier insureds by poorer insureds.211
In 2012, Congress attempted to address these problems by enacting
a far-reaching reform of the NFIP. The revisions priced flood insur-
ance closer to actual risk, phased out subsidies, eliminated repetitive
loss properties from the programs, and provided funds to update flood
maps.212 But public resistance, especially from coastal property own-
207. See CTR. FOR INS. POLICY & RES., FLOOD RISK AND INSURANCE 3 (2017),
available at https://www.naic.org/documents/cipr_study_1704_flood_risk.pdf; Vivien
Lee & David Wessel, The Hutchins Center Explains: National Flood Insurance Pro-
gram, BROOKINGS, (Oct. 10, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2017/10/
10/the-hutchins-center-explains-national-flood-insurance-program/ [https://perma.cc/
KH5V-PJCL] (“[P]remiums are too low, given the risks that the program takes. This
mismatch reflects political resistance against premiums that actually reflect flooding
risks, flawed mapping methods that don’t accurately assess flood risks, lax enforce-
ment of program rules, and the cycle of rebuilding damaged properties with NFIP
payouts (often without risk mitigation such as relocations, removals or building eleva-
tions), only to be flooded again. Further, obsolete FEMA flood-risk maps tend to
distort premiums, hinder property relocation to safer areas, and obscure the risk of
flood-prone areas from consumers. NFIP ‘grandfathering’ practices allow property
owners to follow rules based on older versions of FEMA flood maps. For example,
buildings constructed in compliance with previous flood ratings are not required to
update their structural requirements, even if new classifications indicate greater flood-
ing risk.”).
208. KOUSKY & SHABMAN, supra note 205, at 1. A 2011 report by the Property
Casualty Insurers Association of America estimated that premiums households pay
are, on average, about half of what would be charged in the private market, and in
high-risk areas, premiums are about one-third. Lee & Wessel, supra note 207.
209. Howard Kunreuther et al., Structure Specific Flood Risk Based Insurance, 4 J.
EXTREME EVENTS 3, 11 (2017).
210. See Michael Keller et al., Outdated and Unreliable: FEMA’s Faulty Flood
Maps Put Homeowners at Risk, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.bloom
berg.com/graphics/2017-fema-faulty-flood-maps/ [https://perma.cc/6URA-2JZ4].
211. See Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for
the Rich, POLITICO (Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/
2017/08/08/hidden-subsidy-rich-flood-insurance-000495 [https://perma.cc/F5AJ-
9RBH].
212. Biggert-Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-141, 126
Stat. 916.
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ers who experienced steep increases in premiums as the risk-adjust-
ments occurred, led to the repeal of the 2012 reforms fourteen months
later.213 The resistance was understandable; those policyholders who
benefited from subsidized insurance after receiving encouragement to
move into and build in high-risk areas were not interested in reforms
that better matched premiums with risk. At the time of this Article,
how this will finally resolve, if it does, is uncertain.214
Despite deficiencies in the federal intervention in flood insurance
markets, governmental interventions in insurance markets are not al-
ways flawed. Although imperfect, state regulation of insurance com-
panies for solvency through reserve and capital requirements has
generally been effective, as have state regulatory efforts with respect
to licensing, anti-discrimination, and unfair trade practices.215 Federal
interventions in other areas have also successfully achieved their
goals.216 Although the NFIP has not functioned so well, at some point
the NFIP will be repaired and modified with a mix of reforms selected
from some of the following items: (1) requiring all owners of property
with mortgages to purchase flood insurance, instead of only owners of
properties located in flood-prone areas, or, alternatively, requiring all
owners of property in designated flood zones to purchase flood insur-
ance without regard to the properties’ encumbrances; (2) increasing
213. See Logan Strother, Five Reasons That Flood Insurance Will Fail Without Re-
form, Post and Courier (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www.postandcourier.com/opinion/
commentary/five-reasons-that-flood-insurance-will-fail-without-reform/article_0f14ed
4e-99a0-11e7-a601-ffda4152bcc5.html [https://perma.cc/586R-DJY3].
214. As the NFIP reauthorization deadline approached in 2018, Congress was una-
ble to forge a consensus set of reforms to guide the program moving forward. On July
31, 2018, Congress passed, and President Trump signed, a short-term extension of the
NFIP, just hours before the program was set to expire on August 1, until November
30, 2018, but no progress has been made in addressing needed long-term reforms in
the program exacerbated by the losses in the 2018 hurricane season.
215. See JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 66, at 86–95.
216. The federal deposit insurance system has helped maintain confidence in the
national banking system and played a major role in averting worse conditions that
easily could have unfolded during the recession that began in 2008. See FEDERAL
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION, https://www.fdic.gov/ [https://perma.cc/7FF8-
KG9A]; see FDIC, CRISIS AND RESPONSE: AN FDIC HISTORY, 2008–2013 (2017),
available at https://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/crisis/crisis-complete.pdf. The federal
backstop in the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, first enacted in 2002, has been effective
in stabilizing insurance markets that were thrown into chaos by the September 11
attacks. For more background, see Terrorism Risk Insurance Program, U.S. DEP’T
TREASURY, https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/fin-mkts/Pages/program.aspx
[https://perma.cc/6ZQT-CCDL]. The core problem faced by the nation’s elderly pop-
ulation in the late 1950s and early 1960s was that private insurers would not sell them
insurance or would do so under conditions of very limited coverage terms, or very
high, often unaffordable, premiums. Although controversial when enacted and still
not immune from critique, any fair assessment of Medicare must conclude that it
solved the problem of access to health care for almost all of the nation’s elderly, and
fifty years later, it is hard to imagine that the nation’s political leaders would have
support for returning the country to pre-1965 approaches to insuring the health care
needs of the elderly.
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the accuracy and granularity of NFIP rates through new technologies
and big data analytics that measure flood risk and adjust premiums to
risk; (3) eliminating the ability of high-risk properties to make recur-
rent claims on the NFIP by allowing only one total loss claim per in-
sured location; because this measurement would run with the land and
apply to future owners, some owners, upon a total loss, would opt to
relocate or at least not rebuild; also, prospective buyers would be de-
terred from purchasing a property they could not insure; (4) as premi-
ums rise for some properties due to risk adjustments, providing
means-based subsidies to low-income insureds to maintain access to
coverage; (5) expanding the circumstances under which the program
might purchase flood-damaged property in lieu of paying proceeds to
the owner, and converting the property to public lands; (6) providing
premium reduction incentives to insureds who invest in loss-preven-
tion and mitigation strategies; (7) assessing higher premiums for sec-
ond homes, vacation homes, and investment properties; and (8)
encouraging an increased role for private companies in insuring flood
risk, accompanied by investments in NFIP prevention and mitigation
efforts to offset loss of policy fees that would accompany an increased
private role.217 NFIP deficit forgiveness will likely also accompany this
mix of reforms.
D. Incomplete and Mismatched Disaster Relief
Using government powers to assist disaster victims has a long his-
tory in the U.S., but the expectation that this is a core responsibility of
government did not emerge until the last half of the 20th century. The
first known federal relief effort occurred in 1803 when Congress sus-
pended the obligation of Portsmouth, New Hampshire merchants to
make bond and tariff payments to the federal government in the after-
math of a devastating fire that destroyed large areas of the seaport.218
On 128 occasions between 1803 and 1947, Congress enacted legisla-
tion to provide ad hoc relief—usually in the nature of medical sup-
plies, food, and clothing, or funds to purchase these items—to victims
of various natural disasters.219 Yet the idea that the federal govern-
ment had primary responsibility for assisting natural disaster victims
was not widely accepted. Thus, the federal government deferred to
local government agencies to provide direct relief in the aftermath of
two massive disasters in the early 20th century—the 1900 Galveston
Hurricane and the 1906 San Francisco earthquake. The federal gov-
217. Discussions of how to reform the NFIP are legion. For a useful summary, see
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., FLOOD INSURANCE: COMPREHENSIVE REFORM
COULD IMPROVE SOLVENCY AND ENHANCE RESILIENCE (2017), available at https://
www.gao.gov/assets/690/684354.pdf.
218. FEMA, THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY 3 (2010), availa-
ble at https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/20130726-1823-25045-8164/pub_1_fi
nal.pdf (visited June 18, 2018).
219. Moss, supra note 81, at 312.
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ernment’s limited reaction to these two disasters was, however, con-
troversial, and this led to a national discussion about the proper role
of the federal government in providing relief after major disasters.220
Thus, when the Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 devastated cities and
towns throughout the central U.S., President Coolidge directed Com-
merce Secretary Herbert Hoover to coordinate a federal disaster re-
lief response.221 The 1936 Flood Control Act encouraged the evolving
acquiescence that the federal government had a role in disaster re-
lief.222 Since 1824, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers had built and
managed canals and levees to promote domestic maritime com-
merce,223 but the 1936 statute for the first time declared flood control
as a federal activity and authorized hundreds of federal flood control
projects under the direction of the Corps of Engineers.224
By passing the Disaster Relief Act in 1950, Congress fully embraced
the proposition that disaster relief is a federal responsibility.225 This
statute created the nation’s first permanent federal disaster relief fund
and authorized the federal government to provide relief in the after-
math of “flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, storm, or other
catastrophe in any part of the United States, which in the determina-
tion of the President” is sufficiently severe to justify federal interven-
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (2012) (setting out as the declaration of policy of the 1936
Act that, in part, “it is the sense of Congress that flood control on navigable waters or
their tributaries is a proper activity of the Federal Government in cooperation with
States . . . that investigations and improvements of rivers and other waterways, includ-
ing watersheds thereof, for flood-control purposes are in the interest of the general
welfare; that the Federal Government should improve or participate in the improve-
ment of navigable waters or their tributaries . . . for flood-control purposes if the
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs, and if
the lives and social security of people are otherwise adversely affected”).
223. A Brief History: Improving Transportation, U.S. ARMY CORP ENG’RS, https://
www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Improving-Transpor-
tation/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/YAD5-DR4H]. The U.S. Army
Corp of Engineers was established in 1802, essentially as a successor to the army engi-
neers who belonged to the Continental Army and assisted in the Revolutionary War.
A Brief History: The Beginnings to 1815, U.S. ARMY CORP ENG’RS, https://www.usace
.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Beginnings/ (last visited Sept.
10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/VWF5-UYYR]. A pair of statutes enacted by Congress in
1824 authorized the use of Army engineers to survey road and canal routes, and to
improve the navigation of the Ohio and Mississippi Rivers. A Brief History: Improv-
ing Transportation, supra.
224. A Brief History: Multipurpose Waterway Development, U.S. ARMY CORP
ENG’RS, https://www.usace.army.mil/About/History/Brief-History-of-the-Corps/Intro
duction/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/4826-N9E5].
225. Federal Disaster Relief Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-875, § 1, 64 Stat. 1109, 1109
(1950) (“[I]t is the intent of Congress to provide an orderly and continuing means of
assistance by the Federal Government to States and local governments in carrying out
their responsibilities to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major disasters,
to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the development of
such State and local organizations and plans to cope to with major disasters as may be
necessary.”).
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tion to provide relief.226 As a result, significant disaster experiences in
the 1960s had a visible federal presence in post-disaster relief ef-
forts.227 Congress created the NFIP in 1968, expanded the 1950 fed-
eral disaster relief program through the Disaster Relief Act of 1970,
and established the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration,
FEMA’s predecessor, in 1974.228
By the 1970s, the federal disaster relief framework had become a
patchwork of congressional interventions and reforms, with federal
disaster policy and relief efforts fragmented across approximately 100
different federal agencies.229 In response, President Carter signed an
executive order in 1979 that combined the disaster relief and civil de-
fense responsibilities of several separate federal agencies into the
newly created FEMA.230 Subsequent congressional actions added
earthquake preparedness and mitigation, emergency food and shelter
226. Id. §§ 2(a), 3, 8.
227. The Alaska Earthquake in 1964, Hurricane Betsy in 1965, and Hurricane
Camille in 1969 were the major natural disasters of that era. Hurricane Betsy was the
largest hurricane disaster to ever occur at the time; it was the first hurricane to cause
more than $1 billion in damage. See Scott, supra note 91. In current dollars, the dam-
age caused by Betsy would be $9.6 billion, but given the increased development in the
areas where Betsy made landfall, a similar hurricane would cause approximately $57
billion in insured losses if it were to occur today. See AIR Worldwide, Top 10 Histori-
cal Hurricanes: What Would They Cost Today?, VERISK (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.
verisk.com/insurance/visualize/top-10-historical-hurricanes-what-would-they-cost-to
day/ [https://perma.cc/AZ5A-MWWZ]. After Betsy, Congress ordered the Army
Corps of Engineers to build levees around New Orleans. Bob Marshall, New Orleans’
Flood Protection System: Stronger Than Ever, Weaker Than It Was Supposed to Be,
THE LENS (May 15, 2014, 6:00 AM), https://thelensnola.org/2014/05/15/new-orleans-
flood-protection-system-stronger-than-ever-weaker-than-it-was-supposed-to-be/
[https://perma.cc/NQ4U-G7RA] (reporting on the history of New Orleans’s walls and
levees which began with the Lake Pontchartrain and Vicinity Hurricane Protection
Project). The notorious failure of these levees to protect major sectors of New Orle-
ans in the wake of Hurricane Katrina prompted much controversy post-Katrina. See,
e.g., Ivor LI. van Heerden, The Failure of the New Orleans Levee System Following
Hurricane Katrina and the Pathway Forward, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 24, 35 (2007)
(“The infrastructure failures observed in the Greater New Orleans area . . . resulted in
the loss of life and major property damage and destruction. These failures were man-
made and could have been prevented. A combination of engineering errors and politi-
cal decisions resulted in a hurricane protection system of lesser quality than was
promised to the citizens of Louisiana . . . .”).
228. U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URBAN DEV., FED. DISASTER ASSISTANCE ADMIN.
PROGRAM GUIDE 1–2 (1976) (“The President’s declaration of a ‘major disaster’ or
‘emergency’ authorizes Federal Assistance under the Disaster Relief Act of 1974 and
triggers other Federal disaster relief programs. The federal response is coordinated by
the Federal Disaster Assistance Administration . . . of the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. By executive order 11795, the President delegated the pri-
mary responsibility for administering the Act to the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development.”).
229. See Garrett M. Graff, The Secret History of FEMA, WIRED (Sept. 3, 2017, 7:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/the-secret-history-of-fema/ [https://perma.cc/63P4-
LNKQ].
230. Exec. Order No. 12148, 44 Fed. Reg. 43239 (July 20, 1979).
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assistance, enhanced disaster relief, and dam safety to the FEMA
mission.231
In 1988, Congress passed the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emer-
gency Assistance Act, which encouraged state and local governments
to engage in enhanced preparedness and public assistance programs,
direct assistance to households, hazard-mitigation efforts to reduce
the effects of disasters, and land use and construction regulations. This
statute also created the presidential disaster-declaration machinery,
which makes state and local governments the default first responders
to natural disasters, with a presidential disaster-area declaration
amounting to a determination that a disaster is too severe for state
and local governments, with the aid of private agencies, to manage
relief efforts without federal assistance.232
In the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, Congress combined
twenty-two federal agencies in 2002, including FEMA, into the presi-
dential-cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security.233 The effec-
tiveness of this reorganization was much debated at the time,234 and at
least two FEMA directors warned that the complexities and intra-
agency competition for resources had substantially eroded FEMA’s
ability to respond to a natural disaster.235 Hurricane Katrina validated
231. Earthquake Hazards Reduction Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-124, 91 Stat. 1098
(earthquake preparedness and mitigation); Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assis-
tance Act, Pub. L. No. 100-77, 101 Stat. 482 (1987) (emergency food and shelter assis-
tance); Disaster Relief Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143 (enhanced
disaster relief); Water Resources Development Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-303, 110
Stat. 3658 (establishing a national dam safety program).
232. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance, supra note
24. Under the Stafford Act framework, a presidential disaster declaration may author-
ize either or both of two programs: Public Assistance, which provides aid to local
governments, and Individual Assistance, which helps households. SHAWN REESE,
CONG. RES. SERV., R45085, FEMA INDIVIDUAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: IN BRIEF 1
(2018). A third program, Mitigation Assistance, is included in all disaster declarations.
Id.
233. Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.
234. See, e.g., Jonathan Thessin, Department of Homeland Security, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 513, 525–31 (2003); Pete Brush, The Homeland Security Debate, CBS (June 11,
2002), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-homeland-security-debate/ [https://
perma.cc/9C7P-C66A]; Bush Signs Homeland Security Bill, CNN (Nov. 26, 2002, 1:10
AM), http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/11/25/homeland.security/ [https://
perma.cc/5LT9-2X9B].
235. In 2004, James Witt, who served as Director of FEMA from 1993 to 2001,
expressed concern that the nation’s ability “to prepare for and respond to disasters”
had been “sharply eroded.” The Homeland Security Department’s Plan to Consolidate
and Co-locate Regional and Field Offices: Improving Communication and Coordina-
tion Before the Subcomm. on Energy Policy, Nat. Res. & Regulatory Affairs, 108th
Cong. (2004) (statement of James Lee Witt, Former Director of the Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency). In 2003, then-FEMA Director Michael Brown com-
plained in a memo that the “capacity” of FEMA had “disintegrated” as a result of the
reorganization. Michael Grunwald & Susan B. Glasser, Brown’s Turf Wars Sapped
FEMA’s Strength, WASH. POST (Dec. 23, 2005), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
archive/politics/2005/12/23/browns-turf-wars-sapped-femas-strength/323fd421-78f3-44
ce-a667-9c60c5473d86/?utm_term=.352216453cfc [https://perma.cc/J84M-JTAR].
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these predictions when it made landfall in 2005; the federal response
to Katrina was widely criticized for its delay, disorganization, and in-
adequacy, and FEMA took the brunt of much of this criticism.236 In
direct response, Congress passed the Post-Katrina Emergency Man-
agement Reform Act in 2006,237 which restated FEMA’s core missions
as “preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and mitigation.”238
This broadly defined set of purposes explicitly acknowledged the fed-
eral government’s role in all phases of a disaster, including pre-disas-
ter planning and preparation, civil protection as a disaster unfolds,
and post-disaster relief.239
Few argue that disaster relief is unimportant when catastrophe
strikes, but a problem arises when the expectation of disaster relief
encourages underinvestment in preparation, which leads to a greater
need for disaster relief in the aftermath of disasters. Spending ex ante
for loss prevention, mitigation, and insurance is illogical if ex post as-
sistance is forthcoming.240 This moral hazard problem is what econo-
mist James Buchanan described as the Samaritan’s dilemma;241 if
individuals and firms expect disaster relief ex post, they will under-
invest in prevention, mitigation, and insurance.242 Kousky, Michel-
Kerian, and Raschky found in their research that “federal post-disas-
ter grants provided to households for uninsured losses have a negative
impact on average insurance coverage across all measures of [Individ-
ual Assistance], although significance levels vary.”243
Moreover, even granting that ex post disaster spending is subop-
timal when compared to equivalent investments in pre-loss prevention
and mitigation, it is impossible to imagine a congressional majority
resisting calls to increase relief spending whenever disaster strikes.
Elected officials assume that they will pay dearly in the political pro-
cess if they are perceived to oppose post-disaster spending.244 Media
236. See Patrick Marshall, Disaster Readiness: Is FEMA Prepared for Weather Ca-
tastrophes?, CQ RESEARCHER (Jan. 12, 2018), http://library.cqpress.com/cqresearcher/
document.php?id=CQresrre2018011203 [https://perma.cc/6R6U-J4TA] (discussing
how “FEMA’s public image hit a new low” during and after the Katrina response).
237. Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-295,
120 Stat. 1394.
238. Id. § 503.
239. A comprehensive summary of how disaster relief is delivered through federal
mechanisms is beyond the scope of this article, but FEMA is not the only agency
through which disaster relief is provided. See GAO-08-7, supra note 162, at 15–17.
240. See MICHEL-KERJAN & VOLKMAN-WISE, supra note 146, at 4.
241. See James Buchanan, The Samaritan’s Dilemma, in ALTRUISM, MORALITY,
AND ECONOMIC THEORY 71–85 (Edmund S. Phelps ed., 1975).
242. See Carolyn Kousky et al., Does Federal Disaster Assistance Crowd out Flood
Insurance?, 87 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 150, 151 (2018). The term “charity hazard”
is also used to refer to the effect of private philanthropy crowding out the purchase of
insurance. Id. at 151.
243. Id. at 162.
244. See id.
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attention on the suffering of disaster victims is extensive.245 When this
is coupled with the public’s deeply held expectation that the govern-
ment will provide ex post relief,246 media coverage helps make the
consequences of perceived unresponsiveness to disasters by public of-
ficials potentially severe.247
In addition, the budgeting process for natural disasters, as a practi-
cal matter, forecloses efforts to constrain spending, should Congress
desire constraint. FEMA bases its budget requests on past major di-
sasters, but this approach has not anticipated extraordinary loss years
and has usually failed to reserve sufficient funds to cover any given
year’s disaster costs.248 Thus, a pattern has developed where Congress
appropriates emergency funds in the aftermath of a natural disaster to
supplement the exhausted FEMA budget.249 This ad hoc, case-by-case
approach is not a coherent strategy; in fact, the pattern of appropria-
tions suggests that political considerations, rather than an objective
measure of need, are the overriding factors in how much relief is pro-
vided in response to particular catastrophes.250
245. J. Brian Houston et al., Disaster News: Framing and Frame Changing in Cover-
age of Major U.S. Natural Disasters, 2000–2010, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q.
606, 613 (2012) (“Disaster characteristics that are likely to drive news coverage in-
clude the number of people killed by the disaster, number of people injured, number
of people affected in other ways, and amount of destruction and damage.”).
246. This increased expectation is evident in the increased number of presidential
major disaster declarations in recent years. See Disaster Declarations by Year, FEMA,
https://www.fema.gov/disasters/year?field_dv2_declaration_type_value=dr&=apply
(last visited Sept. 11, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5JAC-BVZ7]. There were 186 declara-
tions issued in the 1960s and 560 in the 2000s. Id. From 2010 to 2018, 522 have been
issued. Id.
247. See, e.g., Douglas Brinkley, The Flood That Sank George W. Bush, VANITY
FAIR (Aug. 26, 2015), https://www.vanityfair.com/news/2015/08/hurricane-katrina-
george-w-bush-new-orleans (last visited July 10, 2018) [https://perma.cc/MC88-
M5XQ]; Two-in-Three Critical of Bush’s Relief Efforts, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 8,
2005), http://www.people-press.org/2005/09/08/two-in-three-critical-of-bushs-relief-ef-
forts/ [https://perma.cc/4MML-3XYY]. The political ramifications of the governmen-
tal response to the three 2017 hurricanes are still uncertain. The weight of opinion is
that the Trump administration’s response to the effects of Hurricane Maria in Puerto
Rico was deficient. See Robinson Meyer, What’s Happening With the Relief Effort in
Puerto Rico?, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/
archive/2017/10/what-happened-in-puerto-rico-a-timeline-of-hurricane-maria/541956/
[https://perma.cc/85ZC-XJFN]. But differences existed in the administration’s re-
sponses to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria, in that quicker and more robust re-
sponses occurred in response to the losses in Texas and Florida. See Ron Nixon &
Matt Stevens, Harvey, Irma, Maria: Trump Administration’s Response Compared,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/27/us/politics/trump-
puerto-rico-aid.html [https://perma.cc/JWE9-S64A]; Danny Vinik, How Trump Fa-
vored Texas Over Puerto Rico, POLITICO (Mar. 27, 2018), https://www.politico.com/
story/2018/03/27/donald-trump-fema-hurricane-maria-response-480557 [https://
perma.cc/SP4B-JGCB].
248. Marshall, supra note 236.
249. Id.
250. See Nicole Einbinder, How the Response to Hurricane Maria Compared to
Harvey and Irma, FRONTLINE (May 1, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/arti
cle/how-the-response-to-hurricane-maria-compared-to-harvey-and-irma/ [https://
\\jciprod01\productn\T\TWL\6-2\TWL206.txt unknown Seq: 55 15-FEB-19 10:24
2019] MANAGING HURRICANE RISK 445
In response to the Samaritan’s dilemma, the government could re-
quire a commitment to purchase flood insurance on a going-forward
basis as a condition of receiving disaster relief currently. This require-
ment would improve take-up rates, albeit with impact largely limited
to areas already suffering hurricane damage. Interestingly, Kousky et
al., also found that Small Business Administration disaster-relief loans
“have almost no impact on insurance demand.”251 This latter finding is
not surprising, as recipients disfavor loans relative to grants simply
because loans must be repaid and, unlike grants, do not provide relief
from failures to purchase insurance. Although the study could not test
whether consumers fail to purchase insurance when the receipt of dis-
aster relief is not conditioned on the purchase of insurance, they rea-
soned that “it does seem that [such a requirement] is effective in
preventing decreases in take-up rates after a disaster.”252 The Kousky,
et al. results suggest that increasing loans and limiting the growth in
grants would be more likely to incentivize the purchase of insurance.
Any plan to increase the flood insurance take-up rate must contend
with the problem that many lower-income residents lack the financial
capacity to meet an insurance-purchase or prevention-mitigation in-
vestment condition. Thus, some kind of subsidy system will need to be
a part of this kind of reform. In addition, this system would require an
enforcement mechanism for disaster relief recipients who fail to ad-
here to their insurance purchase commitments.
Another option for disaster relief reform, and one which FEMA has
proposed, would require states to spend a designated amount each
year on disaster preparedness to be eligible for federal financial assis-
tance after major disasters.253 Not surprisingly, state and local offi-
cials, who tend to resist any mandate on increased state expenditures
coming from the federal government, have strongly resisted this disas-
ter-deductibles proposal.254 Yet these officials will be among the first
to request massive infusions of federal disaster relief assistance when-
ever a catastrophe strikes. A deductible structure could be an effective
incentive for ex ante prevention and mitigation efforts. The structure
perma.cc/4RNC-5ZNR] (comparing the response by FEMA to Harvey (Texas), Irma
(Florida), and Maria (Puerto Rico), and finding the immediate response to Maria far
behind the other two in terms of supplies delivered and personnel deployed). See also
Maya Lau, California Lawmakers Upset That Wildfire Money Is Left out of White
House’s Disaster Aid Request, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 19, 2017, 4:10 PM), https://www.la
times.com/local/lanow/la-me-california-wildfire-funds-20171119-story.html [https://
perma.cc/TE5D-QLSR] (noting California lawmakers’ sentiment “that it was ‘mind-
boggling’ the Trump administration did not include any funds for California [wildfire
recovery] in its latest request, most of which will go to hurricane relief in Texas and
Florida.”).
251. Kousky et al., supra note 242, at 162.
252. Id.
253. See FEMA, Establishing a Deductible for FEMA’s Public Assistance Program,
82 Fed. Reg. 4064 (Jan. 12, 2017) (to be codified at 44 C.F.R. pt. 206).
254. See Marshall, supra note 236.
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should take into account the challenges facing small states with small
budgets; thus, the deductible could be tied to population size, the
state’s share of GDP, or some other metric that accounts for a particu-
lar state’s ability to pay.
Overall, the prospects for reforming the current approach to disas-
ter relief are not encouraging. Although public perceptions of natural
disaster risk may be susceptible to shifts in light of the recent exper-
iences of the 2017 season, Professors Healy and Malhotra found that
voters do not incentivize politicians to support pre-disaster planning
and investment in loss reduction and mitigation but do expect post-
loss government disaster relief and will punish politicians who fail to
provide it.255 This suggests that the mismatch between investment and
disaster relief is ultimately grounded in widespread public misappre-
hension of the costs of failing to invest in national preparedness,
which helps explain why the government has tilted its priorities decid-
edly in favor of disaster relief. Healy and Malhotra put it succinctly:
“[a]n ounce of prevention would be far more efficient than a pound of
cure, but voters seem interested only in the cure.”256 On the other
hand, although government underinvestment in disaster preparation is
endemic, it is noteworthy that government does not underinvest in
terrorism prevention and airline security, as the post-9/11 responses
vividly illustrate.257 This discrepancy is predicted by the heuristic that
highly observable events with horrific consequences are perceived as
carrying more risk than abstract events that happen less frequently.
The losses of the 2017 hurricane season might have more salience with
the public than previous hurricane events. A fair prediction, however,
is that this will not be the case. In 2006, Congress quickly acted with a
package of disaster-relief statutory reforms after Katrina, but interest
in hurricane preparedness faded within a few years, suggesting that
hurricane disasters only have a temporary impact on public
attention.258
IV. THE NATURAL DISASTER RISK MANAGEMENT FUTURE
The lack of a comprehensive, effective government strategy for nat-
ural disaster risk management, and the history of the uncompleted ef-
forts to craft one, should be sufficient to demonstrate that creating
such a policy is as much a political problem as it is a risk management
and insurance problem. Except for the consequences of a war fought
partially on American soil, a successful terrorist attack that renders
parts of the U.S. uninhabitable for years or decades, or a pandemic,
no threat to the homeland exists that surpasses natural disaster risk.
Thus, any national preparedness strategy designed to manage such an
255. See Healy & Malhortra, supra note 147, at 388.
256. Id. at 402.
257. Id.
258. See id. at 403.
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eventuality must involve a consensus forged in a national conversation
that includes the executive and legislative branches of the federal
government.
Although understanding risk management and insurance as a niche
within the larger political system is not the way insurance discussions
are usually framed, the insight that politics plays a role in natural dis-
aster risk management is not especially remarkable. It has long been
understood that risk management and insurance mechanisms exist
and operate within the larger political system where values and assets
are allocated.259 Government actors, private individuals, firms, and in-
surance companies constantly make choices about whether to invest in
(or reward) mitigation or prevention, what kinds and scope of cover-
ages to make available at what prices, which individuals or firms to
allow to enter risk distribution pools, or which underwriting classifica-
tions to use or permit to be used. The sum of these choices allocates
and distributes resources and assets in society. How the resulting
gains, losses, benefits, and burdens are allocated will be a part of, and
will ultimately align with, the allocation of values, assets, and re-
sources in the larger political system.
Risk management in any context rarely involves simple questions
and obvious choices, but when a risk implicates national security and
affects tens of millions of people, even imagining solutions that do not
require a national political conversation is very difficult. The most ba-
sic lesson of the risk management-recovery matrix is that the calculus
for creating a national preparedness policy for natural disasters is ex-
traordinarily complex. Understanding the relationships within the ma-
trix is hard because data and knowledge are incomplete in many parts
of the matrix; the impact of pushing one lever within the matrix on the
rest of the apparatus is frequently unknown. In earlier sections, the
discussions isolated some points in the matrix where mismatches and
inefficiencies are more readily observable and are especially signifi-
cant; it also identified some options for future reforms. But at each of
these points, the various solutions, if implemented, create different ar-
rays of winners and losers, which means that discussions of which ones
to choose will be contested.
In other words, the overarching question lying at the heart of the
matrix—and one that is typical of most substantial issues of govern-
ance and public policy—is who should pay for the costs of prevention,
259. This is one of the many important insights of Spencer Kimball, a preeminent
and influential insurance law scholar during the last half of the twentieth century. See
SPENCER L. KIMBALL, INSURANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY (1960); Spencer L. Kimball,
The Purpose of Insurance Regulation: A Preliminary Inquiry in the Theory of Insur-
ance Law, 45 MINN. L. REV. 471, 524 (1961) (“Insurance is a small world that reflects
the purposes of the larger world outside it.”). For an explanation of the well-known
description of politics as a system for the authoritative allocation of values, see DAVID
EASTON, A FRAMEWORK FOR POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1965); DAVID EASTON, A SYS-
TEMS ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL LIFE (1965).
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mitigation, and recovery with respect to hurricanes and other natural
disasters. This is not so much a question of risk management and in-
surance as it is a question of allocation of values within the political
system.
Explaining the political system as a collection of interactions
through which a society’s values are authoritatively allocated has an
important shared element with traditional explanations of risk man-
agement activities and insurance mechanisms. A political system con-
sists of processes and structures, with institutions of government
constituting the most obvious examples of the latter. Authority (i.e.,
the authoritative allocation of values) assumes power, and allocation
assumes scarcity (i.e., limited supplies of assets or resources). Al-
though allocations in a political system need not be entirely distribu-
tive—for example, integrative solutions that create more value are
often available, if the constraints of effort and time permit them to be
found—they are inevitably partly distributive, which means there are
winners and losers, and the losers provide cross-subsidies to the
winners.
Insurance and other risk management strategies share this charac-
teristic; they are essentially exercises in cross-subsidization. The es-
sence of insurance is to pool, ex ante, assets from the many and
redistribute them, ex post, to the unfortunate few who need them
based on agreed standards from the time the pool was created. The
unfortunate who suffer loss benefit from (i.e., are subsidized by) con-
tributions made by the fortunate. Those excluded from the pool are
on their own, and the unfortunate in that cohort bear commensurately
greater burdens from loss-producing events insured by the pool.
The foregoing manner of cross-subsidization is desirable, but not all
kinds of cross-subsidization are. If risk is not valued accurately, those
who pay more in premiums than the value of their risk provide a
cross-subsidy to those who pay less, and this kind of cross-subsidy is
undesirable. Generally, policyholders expect that insurance will be
priced close to the value of the risk transferred. Those who create or
face low amounts of risk do not expect to provide subsidies to those
who make choices to bear more risk. Similarly, those who make
higher-risk choices, although they might prefer to pay less in premi-
ums and might advocate that outcome, cannot reasonably expect
those who make lower-risk choices to pay the larger costs associated
with their higher-risk choices.260 Automobile insurance provides a
260. At a certain point, when the cost of measuring the difference between a
higher-risk choice and a lower-risk choice exceeds the benefit in premium reduction
that can be offered the lower-risk insured, the measurement and the distinction will
not be made, and the higher-risk and lower-risk insureds will be pooled together. In
other words, market settle toward an equilibrium in which insureds of different risk
levels will be grouped within a single pool. For more discussion, see JERRY & RICH-
MOND, supra note 66, at 14–16.
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good illustration: those who drive fewer miles, own less expensive cars
that cost less to repair, and have a history of fewer accidents and traf-
fic tickets do not expect to subsidize the insurance of those who have
accidents more frequently in luxury vehicles that they operate more
often. To translate the example to natural disaster risk, owners of less
expensive homes located in areas with no hurricane risk (e.g., a home-
owner in Green Bay, Wisconsin) do not expect premium pricing that
causes them to subsidize those who own more expensive homes in
higher-risk areas (e.g., an owner of beachfront property in Pensacola
Beach, Florida).
Because there are cross-subsidies throughout the risk management-
recovery matrix, one way to frame a discussion about future risk man-
agement policy is to ask how these cross-subsidies should be designed.
Our society has rejected on both economic and political grounds an
answer that each individual and firm is on its own when dealing with
natural disaster risk, so some cross-subsidy of disaster victims is cer-
tain to occur. The government plays an indispensable role in natural
disaster recovery, and public resources will always be important ele-
ments of the matrix, so taxpayers generally will be a source of the
cross-subsidy to disaster victims. But are there limits on these cross-
subsidies? Should the taxpayer cross-subsidy be limited when an indi-
vidual fails to purchase available flood insurance, or fails to invest to
some extent in pre-loss mitigation? Likewise, it is impossible to imag-
ine a scenario where insurance will not play a major role in preparing
for natural disaster loss and in providing compensation for loss once it
occurs. To the extent private insurance is part of the grand strategy,
the cross-subsidies are internal to the risks transferred to and distrib-
uted within the pool of covered insureds. To the extent government
resources are used to subsidize the purchase of premiums in the pri-
vate market, backstop the coverage, or underwrite the risk, the tax-
payers provide the cross-subsidy. In these situations, are there limits
to taxpayer-provided cross-subsidies resulting from a need for fiscal
restraint in the context of expanding federal budget deficits? Further,
the challenges created by the nature of natural disaster risk—i.e., all
the factors that make it a difficult risk261—render it impossible to im-
agine a scenario where government will not play a role in regulating
and supporting the private market. But, again, the question is how
much support at what cost, with the resulting cross-subsidies, is too
much?
The last question posed is not unfamiliar territory. Our political sys-
tem is well acquainted with lines of insurance where a social policy
intervenes and recasts the undisturbed market’s cross-subsidies. When
insurance is viewed as being imbued with characteristics of a public
good to which all should have access, the economic realities of those
261. See Jerry & Roberts, supra note 150.
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who have less ability to pay for the insurance sometimes leads to a
government-imposed, means-based premium structure or a public
subsidy arrangement that enables lower-income, lower-wealth individ-
uals to have access to the market. In other situations, the high costs of
insurance are perceived to impair useful, publicly valuable economic
activity by individuals and firms, causing government to intervene to
cap liabilities or regulate the market to make insurance more accessi-
ble. When this happens, the cost of access is ultimately subsidized by
someone other than the firms and businesses that receive the benefit
of the access. Does protection from natural disaster risk rise to this
level of public good such that these kinds of market reforms are ap-
propriate? Thus far, the outcomes in the U.S. political process indicate
that the answer is in the affirmative, as this is the premise behind the
creation of the NFIP and underlies the country’s willingness to invest
enormous sums in ex post disaster relief assistance. But how far should
this willingness extend, especially given the misfiring in the current
NFIP apparatus and the rapidly increasing costs of natural disaster
relief?
The enormous costs of hurricanes and other natural disasters lay
these kinds of questions squarely before us. Finding good answers is
difficult. For example, in a market where many property owners al-
ready choose not to insure hurricane risk, accurately pricing wind and
flood risk in hurricane-prone areas will drive prices higher, which will
cause some policyholders to leave the market and make the market
less accessible to those with limited financial resources. Absent gov-
ernment intervention to ameliorate these effects, insurance purchases
will decline, which will have two consequences: (1) more households
will endure greater financial hardship; and (2) the burdens on ex post
disaster relief programs will grow—assuming disaster relief continues
to enjoy a high priority in the list of core government responsibilities.
Other intersections in the matrix raise similar questions. For exam-
ple, who should pay for prevention and mitigation efforts? One point
of view would place these costs on the owners of the properties and
assets that receive the benefits of prevention and mitigation, but in
many instances these costs are prohibitive. Yet failing to take these
measures puts pressure on disaster relief, which is essentially a cross-
subsidy provided by taxpayers. To relieve taxpayers from the burdens
of paying for post-loss disaster relief—essentially a massive subsidy
from the taxpaying public to victims of disasters—Congress could
choose to shift the taxpayer subsidy to mitigation and prevention ex-
penditures that reduce the burdens on post-disaster relief efforts.
When assets important to national security are located in harm’s way
(i.e., the Houston petrochemical industry262), the case for public in-
262. See Bill Gilmer, Proximity Counts: How Houston Dominates the Oil Industry,
FORBES (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/2018/08/22/proximity-
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vestment in prevention and mitigation is stronger. But even here the
argument is controversial: Should taxpayers subsidize prevention and
mitigation efforts to benefit industries whose products—even if used
willingly by consumers (many of whom resist conservation efforts that
would reduce reliance on the products in question)—have contributed
to the climate change that increases the catastrophic losses that neces-
sitate the increased investment in mitigation?263
Yet another question with cross-subsidy implications involves
whether prevention, mitigation, and relief efforts should occur prima-
rily at the federal level or at the state and local levels of government.
Just over half of all states currently have dedicated disaster relief
funds, some of which contain no money, and some of the most ex-
posed states (e.g., Florida) are among those without dedicated disaster
relief funds.264 Although some argue—reminiscent of the federal-state
relationship for disaster assistance of nearly 100 years ago—that disas-
ter relief is primarily a local and state responsibility, the reality is that
stressed state budgets are not capable of assuming the primary finan-
cial responsibility for either disaster relief or prevention and mitiga-
tion investments.265 Although the lack of state readiness may be one
result of the assumption that the federal government is poised to pro-
vide disaster relief and to supplement it when needed, no small
amount of irony exists in the fact that lax state and local regulation
coupled with underinvestment in pre-loss disaster relief funds in some
regions results in increased natural disaster losses. Yet to the extent
the federal government assists state efforts, a cross-subsidy is created
between taxpayers in states that do not face the hurricane risk and
those in states that do. One point of view is that this cross-subsidy
counts-how-houston-dominates-the-oil-industry/#6caa1a6a6107 [https://perma.cc/
CSZ7-5E8C].
263. This is the essence of the debate over a controversial proposal to build, largely
at federal government expense, a $61 billion network of concrete seawalls, earthen
barriers, floating gates, and steel levees on the Texas Gulf Coast to protect the pe-
trochemical industry and other assets along the Gulf. See Jonathan Hilburg, Texas
Fast-Tracks Seawalls for Oil and Gas Infrastructure, ARCHITECTS NEWSPAPER (Aug.
23, 2018), https://archpaper.com/2018/08/rebuild-texas-seawalls-oil-gas-infrastructure/
[https://perma.cc/P62K-MTD2]; Will Weissert, Big Oil Asks Government to Protect It
From Climate Change, AP NEWS (Aug. 22, 2018), https://apnews.com/4adc5a2a2e6b45
df953ebcba6b63d171 [https://perma.cc/RLW6-PMRE].
264. See Marshall, supra note 236.
265. See Cezary Podkul & Heather Gillers, Why Are States So Strapped for Cash?
There Are Two Big Reasons, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 29, 2018, 1:52 PM), https://www.wsj
.com/articles/why-are-states-so-strapped-for-cash-there-are-two-big-reasons-15222555
21 [https://perma.cc/4AJ7-LADP] (explaining that states are already facing challenges
to maintain core services in the face of increasing costs of Medicaid and public-em-
ployee health and retirement costs). A foreseeable $200 billion disaster event dwarfs
the Florida budget ($88.7 billion FY2019 budget) and is roughly equivalent to the
entire two-year budget in Texas ($217 billion for the 2018 and 2019 budgets). See TEX.
COMPTROLLER OF PUB. ACCOUNTS, CERTIFYING THE 2018–2019 TEXAS STATE
BUDGET, available at https://comptroller.texas.gov/about/media-center/infographics/
2017/budget-certification/.
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should not be expanded in circumstances where leaders of at-risk
states have decided to keep taxes low for the benefit of their residents
in lieu of investing in substantial prevention and mitigation efforts.
Seven states have no state income tax, but two of these—Texas and
Florida—are prime targets for hurricane losses and thus are among
states that are most likely to seek federal disaster relief.266
At the end of this assessment, then, articulating an effective, coher-
ent natural disaster risk management policy remains difficult, and an-
swers to questions about how to best shape the various cross-subsidies
remain elusive. Designing a proposal that will survive the political
process intact is daunting. Perhaps, then, the most important lesson of
the natural disaster risk management-recovery matrix can be summa-
rized with economist Thomas Sowell’s famous observation: “There are
no solutions; there are only trade-offs.”267
266. Marshall, supra note 236. Texas and Florida ranked 34th and 43rd, respec-
tively, in total state and local tax revenue per capita in 2015. See Rankings of State and
Local Per Capita General Revenue, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Dec. 15, 2017), https://www.tax
policycenter.org/statistics/rankings-state-and-local-capita-general-revenue [https://per
ma.cc/9BYT-D7Q8]. These states, and others at the bottom end of tax collections per
capita, may make claims on general federal revenues for direct subsidies for disaster
relief.
267. THOMAS SOWELL, THE VISION OF THE ANOINTED: SELF CONGRATULATIONS
AS A BASIS FOR SOCIAL POLICY 142 (1996).
